On the rebellions in the working-class suburbs of France
Published Dec 16, 2005 8:09 PM
By Samir Amin (1) and Rémy Herrera
(2)
Many things have been written, in France and abroad, that
partially or completely misrepresent the events that the media called the
“insurrection of the suburbs” or “urban guerrilla
warfare,” which took place between the end of October (after the death
under suspicious conditions of two young people pursued by the police force of
Clichy-Sous-Bois) and the end of November (after the decision of the
Chirac-Villepin-Sarkozy government to extend the state of emergency for three
months).
This distortion reached a ridiculous level when the embassies of
several foreign countries published safety instructions for their nationals
residing in French territory. France was not in flames. The disorders took place
only in or near the cités and districts of the poorest suburbs (3) of the
country, where a number of the poorest families are parked in towers and walls
of concrete—and where tourists and business executives seldom go.
The young people who revolted against the established order focused their
attack on tangible properties by setting fire to cars by the thousands, and to
shopping centers, police stations, banks, and so on, but not against
people—except for the police force. Our goal here consists not in
justifying these acts of gratuitous violence, especially when it is known that
they affected public property (schools, public transport, etc.), but to try to
understand the reasons for this revolt.
Without accepting the forms that
it took, much of France understood this explosion and, indeed, considered it
absolutely inevitable. And we know the entire society (capitalist) that we are
part of offers nothing to these young people: neither satisfactory housing
conditions, nor education leading to stable employment, nor hope of social
advancement, nor recognition; nor does it listen to them. The most tangible
connection that these young people maintain with the capitalist state consists
of being stopped, questioned and searched by the police force, which is
sometimes brutal and is always intimidating and humiliating.
Many
observers spoke out, and rightly so, against the repression directed at the
youths, but they did it in general by concentrating their criticisms on the
Minister of the Interior [Nicolas Sarkozy], a candidate for the presidential
election of 2007. His resignation, and it alone, would obviously not resolve the
problems of the suburbs. Provocations from Sarkozy, who claims to want “to
clean with the karcher” [high-pressure water hose] the cités of the
“rabble” who “pollute them,” were received by the
inhabitants of the cités as the insults they were intended to be, but
also as a demonstration of hatred against the poor in general. The working class
as a whole, employed and unemployed, all those who undergo and who resist the
destructive offensive of neoliberalism, felt they were his targets.
Those
who interpret the rebellions solely through the framework of race and religion
forget that this revolt poses at root a problem of class. It was a rebellion of
the children of the common people, whose conditions of life are insecure and who
are currently learning about what the class struggle is from the blows that the
repressive state apparatus strikes against them: reinstatement of the double
penalty of prison and deportation, expeditious [in]justice with sentences given
immediately on the first court appearance, sometimes on the night of the arrest
and with disproportionate punishment—such as one year of prison for
setting fire to garbage cans, or the deportation of holders of residence permits
who were picked up during the riots.
The repression that came down on
these young people is class repression, directed against the poor, against this
underprivileged class of the cités, of diverse origins. That a number of
them are of foreign origin (North African and sub-Saharan especially) does
nothing to diminish the fact that the common point of those who revolted,
whether they be descended from French parents or from immigrants or from
foreigners, is poverty. And that is translated, geographically, by an urban
planning that pushes them back, that relegates them to these zones.
This
class repression, aggravated by the race hatred of the narrow, bloated,
coupon-clipping French elite that is weighing down the young rebels of the
suburbs explains, among other things, a fact that is often hidden. Even through
the confusion of the confrontations, these young people—who are also
included among the people of France, and in their very vast majority are
“ordinary people”—through their struggles are the bearers of
an alternative to the current society.
This alternative is neither
presented as a theory, nor is it conceptualized, nor even clarified, but it is
practiced in the course of application in the hard reality of the cités:
in the drudgery of daily life—failures at school, discrimination,
unemployment, noisy and deteriorated housing, badly served by too-expensive
public transport, among all the too-rare social and cultural infrastructures.
The alternative that these young people in the working-class districts
are bearing is the antithesis of the anti-social project of the French
bourgeoisie and the European elites; it is a symmetrical but inversed image of
the urban-racial-social apartheid preached through the extreme right-wing
program of [Jean-Marie] Le Pen (4), which is hateful, xenophobic and
reactionary. This alternative is also the exact opposite of the world apartheid
wanted by [George W.] Bush from the United States.
The paradox, and part
of the difficulty of understanding the direction of these rebellions, is that
these alienated young people are completely permeated by the U.S. consumerist
way of life (clothing, food, games, slang, cultural references), but, with their
anti-racism in action in the cités, they reject the mode of existence of
the United States, that is to say, the violence of a system of internal
segregation and external war—not the violence of groups of young people
who set fire to cars, but of the number 1 terrorist state of the world, waging
war against the poor. Even if the majority of these young rioters are not
politicized, their action is political.
The alternative which is being
built today, first of all in these cités of the suburbs, and for which
these young people fight in the first line of the struggle along with their
parents, friends and neighbors, is that of an ethnically mixed, multicolored
France, open to the world—and especially to the South, the Third World, a
France strong and proud of its diversity, cosmopolitan and accepting. A France
which does not forget that its revolution in 1789 had elected the German
Aracharsis Cloots as a deputy, that the Paris Commune in 1871 had included the
Polish generals W. Wrobleski and J. Dombrowski, nor especially the millions of
foreigners who gave their lives to defend it.
What these young people
remind us, in the very fury of these events, is that France is growing more
diverse, that Marianne has brown skin.
The evidence is there: in the
working classes, among the ordinary people, many of the young people and also
those not so young made their choice long ago. Despite the difficulties
confronting such an anti-racist project, in the poor districts, the fields of
battle on which the decisive combat against racism is held, very broad sectors
of the people, including those from the middle class, consciously chose with
courage and tolerance to accept each other, to live and build a life together,
in mutual respect.
The great majority of the young people who rose up are
French and have no need “to be integrated” (integrated into what,
besides?). They need to be accepted and recognized for what they are and what
they do: they are French like the others, they will build the France of
tomorrow: a society of mutual acceptance, interbreeding, a confraternity of the
races and nationalities.
We are far from the stereotype of racist France,
in the process of growing toward fascism under the impact of Le Pen’s
program. That France, the heir to the shameful France of Vichy (5) and the OAS
[Secret Army Organization] (6), is part of the “indefensible”
Europe, as [Aimé] Césaire (7) said. The National Front regenerated
at the beginning of the 1980s, when the country was in the hands of [President
Francois] Mitterrand, who was eager to break the influence of the Communist
Party.
The National Front built on the nauseating manure of the history
of the French bourgeoisie—that of slavery, colonization, collaboration
with Nazism and imperialism. Le Pen corrupted those whom neoliberalism had
impoverished. And the victories gained against him in 2002, in which this
multi-colored youth of the suburbs also took part, those same people who knew
enough to mobilize to say “No” last May to the referendum on the
European Constitution, are decisive for the defense of the values of the
republic, of what the 1789 revolution contained that was universal.
The
political weight of the National Front is due not to the so-called racism of the
people of France, but rather to the reaction of the extremist factions of the
national bourgeoisie to those who adopted the anti-apartheid choice already
practiced by the young people of the working-class districts. And there is still
a long way to go before our elites agree to begin the debate on what they
subjected the people of France and the world to in the past: slavery and the
colonial wars, Petainism in France and the support of the neofascist
dictatorships of the South. Such a long way still before the debate opens on
what our bourgeoisie, chief executive officers of the transnational corporations
and high officials in charge of the state have done to France and the world:
keeping entire sectors of the people in unemployment and poverty, imperialist
plundering of the South by their corporations and their state.
It is
these young people of the suburbs who confront Le Pen—and his substitutes
from the “moderate” right-wing, through whom Le Pen exerts his
influence. The cités suffer the bulk of the innumerable social disasters
caused by the neo-liberal policy imposed on the French people since the
beginning of the 1980s by both the Socialist Party and the traditional
right-wing, which alternately head the government.
But is France a
democratic country, since its president, Jacques Chirac, was elected by the
people? And even with 82 percent of the vote!
Now 70 percent of the
French say, don’t rely on him! When they voted against Le Pen, Jacques
Chirac took advantage of it to do a little more of the same thing, always more
neoliberalism. It is not a question of minimizing the importance of the vote
here. But if, for the majority of the French, democracy consists of spending one
Sunday per year walking to the polling station to get in line (in silence), to
nod one’s head when one’s name is called (in silence), to slip an
envelope into the ballot box (in silence) and to return home (in silence), with
nothing changing, it is not much.
When a minority imposes an antisocial
policy on the majority, it is not democracy. To vote so that the only changes
made are those needed to make sure nothing changes is not democracy.
Cohabitation of the old right-wing (traditional) and the new right-wing
(Socialist Party), one more neo-liberal and pro-U.S. than the other, is not
democracy.
It is “a power from outside the people, without the
people and against the people.” It is modern capitalism, neo-liberal, the
power of finance, that is, a “democracy of shareholders.” We voted
on May 29, we said “No” to the submission of the European elites to
U.S. capitalist values, “No” to building neoliberalism into the
Constitution of Europe. It was a class “no,” a no of hope. We won.
Was our voice heard? No. We were beaten, democratically. They all are
still in power. Democratically? How could the young working-class and poor
people possibly believe in this fiction of democracy, those who no one
represents, advocates for or even listens to, who have learned they can count
only on themselves?
Then, since Nov. 8, 2005, in the “sensitive
zones,” the rebels (who are sometimes minors), face a state of emergency.
These laws, “in the event of imminent danger resulting from serious
attacks to the law and order,” free the administrative authorities
(prefects) from the principle of legality usually governing their actions. They
extend their powers in the form of prohibitions on movement of the people, house
arrests of people whose activity proves to be dangerous to law and order
(without “creation of camps where the people would be held”), the
closing of performance spaces and prohibition of meetings likely to cause or to
maintain disorder, searching of homes any time of the day or night, controls on
the press, publications, radios and cinemas, and allowing military tribunals to
seize people for crimes and offenses covered under civil law.
That is to
say, a repressive law that the “democrats” who control us had
previously resorted to only against the Algerians (1955) and the Kanaks of New
Caledonia (1985)—but which, in metropolitan France, they didn’t use
even in 1968. (8) Right-wing mayors had declared curfews in their municipalities
as of nightfall, or the day before (as in Raincy by Eric Rault, former UMP
minister of the city).
Except for a few of the Socialist Party’s
elected officials who frankly declared themselves satisfied with the exceptional
measures taken by the government, the left as a whole condemned this step-up of
repression: the Communist Party (PCF), the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR),
the Greens, the unitary trade-union federation (FSU), MRAP, Human Rights League
(LDH), Magistrates Union, Homeless Committee, the Association of North African
Workers in France, the Center of Studies and of Initiatives of International
Solidarity.
The reactions of the Socialist Party (PS), on the other hand,
were at the very least measured: the first secretary of the PS, François
Holland, declared that “the application of the law of 1955 must be limited
in time and in space” and that its extension was “a bad
symbol.” In November 2001, his wife, Ségolène Royal, then
the minister delegated to Family and Childhood in the [Lionel] Jospin
government, clouded up the validation by the State Council of a local curfew
bylaw, saying at that time: “the word curfew is inadmissible …
warlike.” Jean-Marc Ayrault, the president of the PS group in the National
Assembly, gained approval from half the assembly, mainly the right-wing, when he
proclaimed: “Under such circumstances, the democratic formations must know
to conclude a non-aggression pact.”
It is nevertheless true that
many young people of the suburbs, and of France in general, are today completely
cut off from the struggles for emancipation by the French labor movement and
from knowledge of its history. The schools don’t teach them about these
struggles, and teach even less about the struggles of the people of the South,
nor do the left parties and trade unions educate them.
But what is
undoubtedly more serious still is that many militants and progressives are
unaware of the history and news of resistance in the cités and by the
immigrants in France. These community movements, effervescent, disturbing,
dispersed, are the self-organized expression of the populations of the
working-class districts, mixed French and foreign-born poor, advancing side by
side for a progressive transformation of society.
These struggles emerged
unceasingly from the cités, fed by the burdens of living conditions and
[lack of] work, exploding after each police excess. These struggles ache to be
organized, to be structured, to be linked, though they be weakened by the
offensives of orchestrated recovery, or have had their energies diverted.
In France, the history of the struggles of the inhabitants of the
cités overlaps, without completely encompassing, that of the immigrants.
Since the unleashing of the crisis of the 1970s, its roots have taken hold in
the combat carried out by the immigrants of the “first generation”
to come from the South, who met in order to defend their rights and interests,
involving where they lived and worked in autonomous groups (North-African State,
Movement of Arab Workers, House of Immigrant Workers). At the beginning of the
1970s, hunger strikes by those “without papers” (against the
Marcellin Law) won legal status for some tens of thousands of workers. Despite
severe repression, in 1976 rent strikes by workers at Sonacotra, protesting
against lamentable housing conditions, and then strikes by whole families in the
“transit houses” made it possible to tear down the temporary
housing.
These struggles were reinforced in the 1980s. After people were
confronted with the devasting social effects of neoliberalism and the rise of
the National Front, there was the emergence of movements of young people of the
cités and the immigration of the “second generation.” In
1982, a series of racist attacks involving police brutality incited the creation
of the Gutenberg Association in Nanterre, which contributed to coordinating the
actions of resistance against racism and discrimination and to the
self-organizing of struggles of the inhabitants of the popular districts. The
latter mobilized little by little into a multitude of associations and
initiatives, especially in the Paris and Lyon areas.
After confrontations
between young people and police at Minguettes (Vénissieux) and the call,
“Equal police and justice for all,” several neighborhood
associations were formed: Zaama d’Banlieue in Lyon, Lignes parallel with
Vaulx-in-Velin; and, in Parisian suburbs, Wahid Association and Collective of
Mothers of Victims of Racist and Political Crimes. In 1983 there was a turning
point: some associations in Minguettes (S.O.S. Future in particular) initiated a
large peaceful walk “for equal rights and against racism,” which
left Lyon in October and arrived in Paris in December, gathering more than
100,000 people.
To everyone’s surprise, the impact of this walk was
enormous on both sides: positive, because the “charter of residence of 10
years” was introduced; and negative—particularly the Socialist
Party’s attempt to co-opt the movements of young people of the
cités, primarily the young “beurs” (9), into its electoral
machine.
The most nearly complete illustration of this manipulation of
the young people’s demands was the birth of the association S.O.S. Racisme
in December 1984. Born in the armchairs of the presidential palace, it profited
from considerable material support, in addition to the support of Matignon
[Prime Minister Laurent] Fabius, of the Socialist Youth, of some media
(Libération and Matin), and all the intellectuals and advertising
executives in sight. Then followed, in this spirit, the creation of France Plus
(1985), the subsidies with Radio Beur and the Algerian group Amicale, the
fashion of the “citizenship” around Mémoire Fertile (1987),
and the promotion of what must be called a “beurgeoisy.”
(10)
The gap between established associations (left-wing organizations,
anti-racists, Catholics) and the movements of youth in the working-class housing
projects on the ground continued to widen. Among them, Collectif Jeunes, created
at the end of 1983, made itself known in the Paris area by shock actions:
occupations (of large areas, newspapers, a conference organized by the MRAP and
the PS, etc.), press conferences (in the headquarters of the préfecture
of police in Paris), demonstrating solidarity with immigrant workers fired in
conflict with the foremen and trade unions (at the automobile factories Talbot
of Poissy and Renault at Flins), which marked its final rupture with the PS and
armchair anti-racism.
The various movements, however, still remained
isolated, stuck in their own neighborhoods, cut off from each other. Youth in
the cités and youth from immigrant communities were unable to forge unity
at the National Assembly held at Bron, in June 1984. Too many conflicts
fractured the momentum. One of the points of divergence between associations was
their position on the defense of French or foreign youth with a criminal record.
This, for example, was some of the work of Convergence 84, which came out of
Collectif Jeunes in Paris, or the Young Arabs of Lyon and its suburbs (JALB),
groups which mobilized very early in 1985 against [Interior Minister Charles]
Pasqua’s bill.
The 1990s marked a new spurt of associations and
neighborhood committees, which were a bit more organized in an autonomous way
and on the basis of social and political demands, especially in the suburbs of
Paris (Les Mureaux, Nanterre, Mantes-la-Jolie, Goussainville, Vitry-en-Seine,
etc.) and in Lyon (Vénissieux, Vaulx-en-Velin).
In Paris, an
inter-cités collective, Résistance de Banlieues (Resistance of the
Suburbs), was formed to help the residents in their relations with the police,
the justice system, the bureaucracy of the public housing system, etc. Supported
by organizers from the Collectif Jeunes, new working-class militants emerged in
the cités and out of immigrant communities, self-organizing. One of the
most active groups was the National Committee against Double Punishment (CNDP),
created in 1990 in Ménilmontant (20th district of Paris). [The
“double penalty” was prison followed by deportation.] Its
occupations of offices (of S.O.S. Racisme, of the government, airports, etc.),
hunger strikes and demonstrations of support for youth condemned to economic
difficulties led to this repressive and unjust law (Law Sapin, December 1991)
being questioned.
In Lyon, after the riots in Vaulx-en-Velin (1989-90),
along with new provocations, a committee called the Agora was formed against
police violence and media manipulation in the neighborhood of Mas-du-Taureau.
Its radical militancy brought on a long series of conflicts between this
association and the local authorities (prefect, mayor, Fonds d’Action
social, Social Centers, etc.), but also agreements with the CNDP and with
fractions of older movements, in Paris (Gutenberg) and in Lyon (Lignes
Parallèles, JALB).
The National Assembly of the Banlieues held in
1992 confirmed this convergence of these two associations (and rupture with the
JALB, absorbed by the Greens, not without difficulty.) In the same way they had
disrupted a conference on the city (“Banlieue 89”) organized by the
PS in Bron, which was chaired by President Mitterrand, their militants engaged
in a series of solidarity actions side by side in the neighborhoods: legal
offices and help from lawyers, school support and help in looking for work. In
the local elections of 1995, the Agora and other associations joined to present
a local list, Choix Vaudais, which got nearly 20 percent in Mas-du-Taureau,
following the example of Jeunes Objectif Bron (1989).
The Movement of
Immigration and Banlieus (MIB), which was created at a national convention of
youth held at the Bourse of Travail in Saint-Denis May 1995, is the product of
this struggle history. It is a continuation of the search for the autonomy and
participation of the people living in these working class communities, while
trying to create a relationship of forces the least unfavorable possible. It
also considered how to resist capitalist alienation, how to emancipate youth
from their hatred and desires related to the society of consumption.
The
declared objectives of the MIB are to support and to assemble those in struggle
in these working class communities—against discrimination, racist attacks,
police violence, double penalties, evictions of foreigners; for housing,
employment, respect for the freedom of religion, for the people themselves to
control their future—but also to formulate a strategy of action and
political representation.
From these aims came the effort to restore the
memory of the struggle of immigrants in these working class communities and to
systematically put in perspective the problems encountered in the international
relationship of forces (to explain the waves of repression after the 1991 Gulf
War, at the start of the Intifada, then within the framework of the “fight
against terrorism” after the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, and again after
the invasion of Iraq in 2003).
Obviously, such proposals must be
formulated in a sufficiently broad way to permit their articulation with the
demands of other movements in struggle, which also appeared in the 1990s, such
as: the Right to Housing (DAL), an association formed in 1990 when evicted
families occupied buildings on Réunion Square in the 20th district of
Paris; the Committee of the Homeless (CDSL), created in 1993 to help older
people in economic difficulties and poor people without friends or family;
Rights First! (DD!), created in December 1994; Act against Unemployment! (AC!);
the Group to Intervene in Support of Immigrants (GISTI); Call of the
“Without” launched Dec. 20, 1995, during big strikes of workers
against neoliberalism; National Movement of the Unemployed and Economically
Disadvantaged; Association for Employment, Insertion and Solidarity (APEIS),
among others.
To get the demands of these various movements to converge
is not easy, but the points of convergence are plentiful: for example,
employment. In these suburbs, many youth, even when their papers are in order,
do not find regular jobs—the rate of unemployment is over 20 percent for
such youth, and almost 50 percent among those of African origin.
This is
explained, among other factors, by the persistence of widespread and multiple
discriminations. Their job applications are rejected because they come from a
sector of society for which employers have negative prejudices. Also, in France
as in the other capitalist countries of the North, employers in the clothing
industry, in hotels and restaurants, and in construction use
“clandestine” labor fed by the nearly constant flow of illegal
immigration since the implantation of neoliberalism.
Youth “with
cards” (either French identity or permanent residence) and young people
“without papers” are thus placed in competition in their search for
employment, to the biggest benefit of the capitalists. Repression, which very
seldom touches capitalists, on the other hand falls on illegal workers the
hardest, hit with legal orders to be taken to the border, locked up in detention
centers, expelled by force from the country, and consequently placed in
competition with the new illegal workers who enter by channels organized by big
business.
It is time that the French left expresses its solidarity with
regard to this overexploited sub-proletariat, with these economically
disadvantaged youth of the suburbs. These people of the housing projects
certainly do not constitute the whole of the left’s social base, but
without them, the left will never be truly popular (of the people). What is in
play regarding this solidarity with the demands of the young people of the
suburbs consists of coordinating the traditional struggles of the workers in
France—whether they are French-born, immigrants or foreigners—with
those of the other sectors of the popular classes: the economically
disadvantaged, the unemployed, the undocumented, the homeless, those without
rights.
For the French left and all progressives, this is undoubtedly a
historical opportunity to rebuild clear, modern class positions, a revolutionary
spirit and internationalism. It would be necessary to be quite romantic and
somewhat naive to believe that the objective and subjective conditions of a
radical and immediate transformation of French society are met today.
This is not to suggest that these young people are the inheritors of a
short-winded proletariat in the capitalist centers, or reflect intense agitation
in the peripheries of the South. It is not a question either of denying that
many of these young people quite simply aspire to gain a place in the consumer
society and to raise their social standing in capitalist society. It is not a
question of hiding the fact that some of them have no other aim than
destruction, to return blow for blow to this iniquitous and repressive society
which excludes them. It is not a question of idealizing the demands of these
rebellions—when they have had some—or even less to justify these
forms of violence; moreover, violence is almost always directed against the
inhabitants of these suburbs.
But even if these youth in revolt do not
form parties, even if they still cause much mistrust and a certain concern in
the remainder of the country, the left must see them as allies for the necessary
progressive, social and democratic transformation of France, not just a voting
bloc in the next elections.
Notes:
(1) Samir Amin, based in Dakar,
Senegal, is the president of the Third World Forum and the Global Forum of
Alternatives.
(2) Rémy Herrera is a researcher with the National
Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and teaches at the University of Paris,
Pantheon-Sorbonne.
(3) The “cités” are large-scale
subsidized housing projects; the “banlieus” are the industrial
working-class suburbs surrounding the cities in France. Their rough U.S.
equivalent might be housing projects in rust-belt inner cities.
(4)
Jean-Marie Le Pen is leader of the neo-fascist National Front, the most vicious
of the anti-immigrant parties. In 2002 he was in a run-off election for
president against Jacques Chirac. Chirac won with 82 percent of the
vote.
(5) Vichy was what everyone called the French regime that
collaborated with Nazi Germany’s occupation during World War II. It was
led by Gen. Henri-Philippe Petain and based in the city of Vichy southeast of
Paris.
(6) The Secret Army Organization (OAS) was a pro-fascist group set
up by high French officers who had conducted the colonial war against the
Algerian liberation movement. When President Charles de Gaulle began negotiating
with the Algerians over independence, it attempted to assassinate him.
(7)
Aime Cesaire is a Martiniquan poet, playwright and political leader who supports
self-determination for that Caribbean island, which is still a French
colony.
(8) Algerians waged a long war of liberation and finally won it in
1962. A struggle for self-determination in Kanaky (New Caledonia), a French
territory in the South Pacific, ended after a French sniper assassinated Eloi
Machoro, the leader of the indigenous Kanak movement, in 1985. In 1968 there was
an extended general strike of 10 million workers in France.
(9) The word
“beurs” is a slang name for those with North African
roots.
(10) The term “beurgeoisy” is a
pun.
Translated for Workers World by John Catalinotto and G.
Dunkel.
Articles copyright 1995-2012 Workers World.
Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire article is permitted in any medium without royalty provided this notice is preserved.
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