

THE SILENT SLAUGHTER SLAUGHTER

The role of the United States in the Indonesian massacre

The Silent Slaughter

A Public Inquest on the Indonesian massacre was held at Columbia University on June 2, 1966. It was organized by Youth Against War and Fascism and chaired by its representative, Miss Deirdre Griswold.

The participants at the inquest were Mr. Eric Norden, well-known journalist, Mr. William Worthy, correspondent for the Baltimore Afro-American who had visited Indonesia three times, Professor Andrew March of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, and Mr. Mark Lane, former New York State Assemblyman. Their speeches are reported in full.

Included in the pamphlet is an introduction by Lord Bertrand Russell and an analysis of the Indonesian Council of Generals prepared by the Indonesian Students Association in China.

The pamphlet was prepared and sponsored by Youth Against War and Fascism.

[Added in October 2017 by Workers World: This pamphlet was assembled and issued in 1966 by Youth Against War and Fascism, at that time the youth arm of Workers World Party. It has long been out of print. We have reproduced it here in digital form at a time when some documents of the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia have just been declassified. The major media are saying that the documents reveal that the U.S. knew about the massacres. We say that is just a continuation of the cover-up; that the following pages show how the U.S. was not just a witness but a prime mover in the horrible destruction of the left, anti-imperialist movement in Indonesia.]

Introduction: American Murder Uber Alles

Lord Bertrand Russell

When the events of October 1, 1965, were first reported in the Western press, events which suggested a momentous change in Indonesia, the accounts were uniform from Washington to Bonn. Hundreds of newspaper columns poured forth the story of an abortive "communist" coup which had been overcome by loyal army officers.

Indonesia had the largest Communist party outside of the Communist

countries. The membership was over 3,000,000. Active supporters were estimated to number between fifteen and twenty million people. The Western press would have had us believe that a disciplined party of such dimensions, with vast popular support, made a reckless bid for overt power without a street demonstration, a strike or a call to struggle by the leadership.

The left in Indonesia controlled important trade unions, including transport and communications. It enjoyed a powerful place in the administrative affairs of the nation. How then was it to be explained that a mass party resorted to a "putsch" using methods which would have least effect and exposing itself to terrible reprisals without any attempt at resistance worthy of mention? How, moreover, could the lack of readiness be understood and the absence of a call from the leadership be made explicable as the terrible massacres of communists, trotskyists, socialists and people sympathetic to social advance rose to a cataclysm of slaughter?

During October 1965 two representatives of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, close associates of mine, were in Djakarta on my behalf attending a Conference. In Djakarta few had any doubt about what was taking place around them. The United States Seventh fleet was in Javanese waters. The largest base in the area, feverishly constructed by the United States but a few months earlier on the southernmost point of the southernmost island of the Philippines, was ordered "on alert". General Nasution had a mission in Washington. The United States was directly involved in the day to day events. What then was the role of the U.S. Government in their preparation?

James Reston wrote in the *New York Times* on 19 June 1966:

"One of the most persistent complaints among officials in Washington is that our political troubles in Vietnam are not balanced adequately by reports in the press of the more hopeful political developments elsewhere in Asia.

"The savage transformation of Indonesia from a pro-Chinese policy under Sukarno to a defiantly anti-Communist policy under General Suharto is, of course, the most important of these developments. Washington is careful not to claim any credit for this change in the sixth most populous and one of the richest nations in the world, but this does not mean that Washington had nothing to do with it.

"There was a great deal more contact between the anti-communist forces in that country and at least one very high

official in Washington before and during the Indonesian massacre than is generally realized. General Suharto's forces, at times severely short of food and munitions, have been getting aid from here through various third countries, and it is doubtful if the coup would ever have been attempted without the American show of strength in Vietnam or been sustained without the clandestine aid it has received indirectly from here."

Through Reston, the *New York Times* tells us blandly six months after the event that the United States had direct responsibility for mass murder. He does this not merely with self-congratulatory words but with what he auto-matically assumes. It is worth returning to his words. Reston writes: "*it is doubtful if the coup would ever have been attempted ... or (have) been sustained without the clandestine aid ...*"

In short, the Indonesian Generals made the coup, the right-wing initiated the bloody series of events and they did so because of U.S. strength. More than this, they succeeded in sustaining their counter-revolution and massacre because of American aid.

Here is the bald confession of what we who know the vicious role of the United States Government in world affairs have sought, in vain, to expose in the mass media. How cavalier are the words Reston uses to describe events which comprise the greatest act of mass murder since the gas chambers of Hitler. The *Times* in London estimated the dead at nearly one million in a period of four months. Thus, in four months, five *Times* as many people died in Indonesia as in Vietnam in twelve years.

The Reston story is headed "A Gleam of Light in Asia." He describes these events as "another indication that there may be some hope in Asia." Before setting out the actual sequence of events and the unfolding of this terrifying glut of mutilation and death, it is instructive to quote *Time* magazine:

"Communists, red sympathizers and their families are being massacred by the thousands. Backlands army units are reported to have executed thousands of Communists after interrogation in remote rural jails. Armed with wide-bladed knives ... bands crept at night into the homes of Communists killing entire families and burying the bodies in shallow graves. The killings have been on such a scale that the disposal of the corpses has created a serious sanitation problem ... the humid air bears the reek of decaying flesh ... small rivers and streams ... have literally been clogged with bodies." (17 December 1965)

Max Frankel describes the Johnson Administration's "*delight* with the

news from Indonesia" and the private responses of "officials ... elated to find their expectations being realized." (*New York Times*, 12 March 1966)

The great industrial corporations and the Pentagon to which they are allied have brought the world to a point not previously reached since Hitler's advent. From Vietnam to the Dominican Republic — to Indonesia — the source of murder and misery stems from Washington. Only now is the truth coming to light despite the efforts of many, especially those whose contributions to this important volume are so clear, forceful and unanswerable.

In Indonesia the army with American backing planned through its generals to take power on Army Day, October 5. Anticipating this planned coup, palace guards loyal to Sukarno sought to head off the plot which had been advanced to October 1. They failed. The left, so far from attempting power watched pathetically as its supporters fell to massacre. There is a terrible lesson in this, one which is not restricted to Indonesia nor to the countries exploited by American capital.

No small part of the essential task before us in exposing the full dimension of the evil represented by the Johnson administration and those it serves is the obligation to alert the left in America to its full responsibility. With the exception of the initiative taken by Youth Against War & Fascism in the United States, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation in Britain and solitary individuals in other countries, the peace movement and the socialist movement have failed to stand out against the unimaginable slaughter which has swept a country of one hundred million people.

I am utterly convinced that the world empire which resorts to mass murder in those countries subject to its control will turn that same violence on the American people themselves as the universal revolt against American domination spreads. Fascism is coming to America because America has brought fascism to the world. Vietnam and Indonesia, Cuba and the Dominican Republic, Congo and Angola — are the harbinger — that terrible shadow discerned by Malcolm X when he expressed the only lesson worth teaching the American people upon the death of President Kennedy: "The chickens are coming home to roost." That same fascism which murdered Malcolm X himself confronts the American people with a challenge to save themselves and mankind from their own rulers.

I am fearful that the horror of the Indonesia massacres was only possible because we in the West are so imbued with racism that the death of Asians, even in hundreds of thousands, makes little impact on us. American Negroes know this well. Knowing it they struggle in city

after city across America; knowing it so must all the people of the world engage in overt struggle and I can not sufficiently praise the initiative which has brought forth the *cri de coeur* contained in this essential pamphlet.

A worker or peasant in Indonesia today earns approximately seventy-five cents a month in one of the most richly endowed countries in the world. That wealth is siphoned out by quislings serving the interests of foreign capital. The centre of that capital, the heartland of this system and the source of the military buttress of exploitation is Washington. The murder in Indonesia is a direct expression of the viciousness of a system responsible for suffering, hated by the vast majority of men, driven to desperate slaughter to subdue them and rending the planet itself in vain, barbarous effort. When increasing numbers of Americans see this and organise themselves politically to stop it — not treat with it — we shall have begun a course of action capable after great struggle of winning power for decency and a final end to the mass murder which at once epitomises and defiles our era.

Bertrand Russell,

28 July 1966

MISS DEIRDRE GRISWOLD

We have come here tonight because a horrendous crime, a crime of truly monumental proportions, has been committed. No one knows exactly how many people have been killed in Indonesia in the past eight months. In the literature advertising this meeting, we accepted the figure of 300,000 dead — more people than have been killed in fifteen years of war in Vietnam. It is more than were destroyed in Nagasaki and Hiroshima put together. It's a staggering figure. And yet, I'm afraid that we were wrong. I was given a revised estimate only a few days ago by a professor at the Modern Indonesia Project of Cornell University. She had received her information from an Indonesian official, and the figure she cited to me was that about one million Indonesians have been slaughtered since the right-wing coup of last October. A similar statistic has also appeared in the *Times* of London.

Can mass murder like this be brushed aside? Can the lives of so many people be snuffed out without leaving a ripple in the tide of human events? Well, if the news reporting gave a true and objective picture of our times, then the answer would have to be "Yes," because this colossal

event, that stands in awful significance alongside the fascist conquests of Spain and Germany, has barely stirred the Western press.

We know the power and scope of the communications media. We've seen the tons of newsprint that covered, analyzed, editorialized, interviewed and wept when the victims were several hundred Batista henchmen in Cuba, or a group of white settlers in the Congo. We know how refined the techniques of news gathering are today. A microphone can be hidden underneath a dime. Photographs of the moon's surface can be flashed to the earth and then to TV viewers' screens. But where has there been one picture of the massive carnage in Indonesia? Where has there been one photo, just one? Where, in the Establishment press of this country, has there been one article showing sympathy for the victims of this butchery? Not one major paper has risen above a cold and calculating view of what the coup meant for Washington's Asian strategy. They may call this objectivity, but if that's what objectivity means, then the official reports of those who dutifully chronicled the Nazi crimes are models of honest journalism.

How can it be that the silence and lack of sympathy are so complete? Is it perhaps true that these deaths just don't matter, that they have no importance?

This meeting is being held tonight because the view of history that you would get from a digest of the press is not the truth. It is a distortion of reality. The death of a million Indonesian people can not be glossed over. Their tragedy has deep significance for the world, and our presence here tonight is proof of it.

When Youth Against War and Fascism decided to call this meeting, we did so after much waiting and watching for some protest to develop. But as the months of silence rolled by, we felt the great need for an outcry, both of anger at the bloody deeds being committed, and of sympathy for the victims. But more than anything else, we felt that there was one vital question that had to be raised, that had to be probed and examined. That question is: What role did the U.S. government play in the coup, and what role is it continuing to play in Indonesia's brutal progress to the right?

It is now known that the U.S. government, through the Central Intelligence Agency, participated in a military attempt to overthrow the Sukarno government in 1958. That attempt failed, but does that mean that the C.I.A. packed up its bags and went home? Quite to the contrary. Here and there, in isolated quotes and buried statements, we have been able to pick up the thread of C.I.A. activities since 1958. In a recent *New York Times* survey of the C.I.A., which was written by half a dozen of the

Times key reporters (who, in turn, drew on the experiences of virtually every foreign correspondent on the *Times*' worldwide staff), a most startling reference to the C.I.A.'s Indonesian activities appears. It was on April 27, 1966: "In Southeast Asia over the last decade, the C.I.A. has been so active that the agency in some countries has been the principal arm of American policy. It is said, for instance, to have been so successful at infiltrating the top of the Indonesian government and Army that the United States was reluctant to disrupt C.I.A. covering operations by withdrawing aid and information programs in 1964 and 1965."

By 1964 and 1965, after having failed in one attempt to overthrow the Indonesian government, we now find the C.I.A. again extremely active, but this time with a foothold in "the top of the Indonesian government and Army." And then what? Then came a successful coup and the decapitation of mass opposition in a blood-purge. Was this what Washington wanted? And if so, did they have a hand in it? These are the questions that must be answered.

It is not within the province of an organization like ours to conduct such an investigation. We are a youth group. We are committed to activity and struggle, especially at a time like the present, when masses of people are being brought into the streets in the struggle against the war in Vietnam. We have limited resources, and we have a definite partisan sympathy for the oppressed of the world. What such an investigation does require is a non-partisan, objective body. The work must be done by scholars, historians, and educators. We would be willing to assist such an investigation with clerical and organizational help, and we know how much time and energy these things take. Many people who are qualified to conduct such an investigation have already expressed their concern on this subject. The list of prominent persons who agreed to sponsor this meeting attests to that fact. We have written abroad to a number of world public figures, and they have expressed their willingness to participate in such an investigation.

And if such an investigation had the power of subpoena, it would be most fitting that it call as its first witness Mr. Robert McNamara, U.S. Secretary of Defense, and ask him to clarify the remarks he made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 11 of this year. For on that day, in answer to a question from Senator Sparkman, Mr. McNamara lifted the lid ever so slightly on the role of the U.S. in the Indonesian coup. This was the text of that very brief and guarded exchange:

Senator SPARKMAN: I want to go back to ... our continuing military aid to Indonesia. At a time when Indonesia was kicking up pretty badly —

when we were getting a lot of criticism for continuing military aid — at that time we could not say what that military aid was for. Is it secret any more?

Secretary McNAMARA: I think in retrospect, that the aid was well-justified.

Senator SPARKMAN: You think it paid dividends?

Secretary McNAMARA: I do, sir.

It shouldn't be difficult to know what is implied in these remarks, but it is for an investigating commission to clarify them.

Tonight, our panel of speakers will take up and answer many of the questions that you are asking yourselves. The ideas presented by the speakers do not necessarily represent either the viewpoint of Y.A.W.F. or the viewpoints of those who have given their names as sponsors of this meeting. But all the speakers have been selected for the valuable information and ideas they have to offer on the subject.

MR. ERIC NORDEN

It has been said with considerable justification that the American public is more aroused by the plight of a child trapped in an empty mine shaft in Arizona than by the death of a million people in a famine in India. Perhaps this is due in part to a subliminal racism; but even more, I believe, to the fact that, despite the rise of the American empire, nurtured into existence by Truman, Kennedy, and Eisenhower, and now presided over by Lyndon Baines Johnson, we are still in many ways an insular people. Particularly in the case of Indonesia, it's difficult for the American imagination to conceive the extent of the massacres. When we do see brief mention of them in our press, we tend to dismiss it as if we were reading about an earthquake or some act of nature, so vast is the scale of the human slaughter.

However, it is necessary for us as Americans to study closely what has happened in Indonesia. There is evidence that the political events that led to the right-wing coup and to the slaughter of almost one million people are the direct culmination of a long campaign waged by the United States to reverse the leftward trend within the Indonesian government and win it, if not as an ally, at least as a neutral in the cold war struggle in Asia.

I would like to add at the outset that I don't think this issue should be a sectarian "left" versus "right" one. Of course, in examining the question,

we have to study its political roots. The massacres did not start in a vacuum. They were the culmination of policies planned in Djakarta, and in Washington and London. Nevertheless, this is essentially a profoundly moral issue. I would hope that there would be people on the right of the political spectrum who would deplore the slaughter of these hundreds of thousands of people as volubly and as heartfeltdly as anyone on the left. Our human conscience must not be politically selective. Just to give one example: Italy has a minor but quite active and noisy neofascist party, the M.S.I. I know that I, and I think most of us here, would react in similar protest and opposition if the M.S.I. had staged an attempted coup against the Italian government, and in the aftermath one million M.S.I. members and their families had been massacred by the Italian army and left-wing political allies.

These are people we are dealing with, not abstractions. One of the most vicious legacies of the cold war has been our ability to depersonalize human beings by the use of a label. Once a label such as "Communist" is affixed to people, we no longer believe they have a human personality and identity, human hopes, human fears. If they die — well, the only good Communist is a dead Communist — and we're absolved of all responsibility, even the necessity of grief. I think we owe the million dead in Indonesia something better than that.

U.S. ROLE SINCE 1949 INDEPENDENCE

I have said that current political events in Indonesia have been influenced directly by Washington's policies. This can be verified by studying the events of the last ten or fifteen years. When Indonesia became an independent republic in 1949 after a simmering four-year war with the Dutch for independence, the United States played an interesting and somewhat equivocal role. Initially, we had supported the Dutch attempt to reassert its colonial control. Then, apparently realizing that the burgeoning new American empire might snatch a fresh plum from the desiccated hands of European colonialism, we moved in and gave de facto encouragement to the nationalist forces. But by the early fifties it became quite evident that the Sukarno government was not going to allow itself to be "protected" by the United States, and Sukarno's neutralism became as much a thorn in the side of John Foster Dulles as that of Nehru.

Between 1952 and 1957 there were a series of separatist revolts on some of the Indonesian islands. (It is necessary to point out that Indonesia is not geographically a unitary country but a sprawling empire of 3,000 minor and six major islands, with a population of 105 million, vast natural resources of tin, rubber, tungsten and a vital strategic

position in Asia.) These revolts all failed, and the Indonesian government subsequently made a number of charges of U.S. involvement in them. By 1957, the political balance of power in Indonesia had shifted radically to the left. President Sukarno, after a round-the-world tour in the course of which he had visited Russia and China, returned to announce that the country's unwieldy parliamentary system was going to go. He stated that there were too many national, ethnic, and linguistic divisions in Indonesia to make the old system effective, and he stated his intention to create a new "guided democracy" in which the powers of the president would be vastly increased. Sukarno summed up the political direction of this "guided democracy" in the acronym Nasokom, which meant a coalition of nationalism — primarily the army, religion, and communism. The Communists were admitted into the cabinet for the first time, and Washington was deeply alarmed by the trend of events.

Toward the end of 1957, John Foster Dulles' brother, Allen, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, made a top-secret visit to Indonesia, traveling across the country, conferring at American consulates in various Indonesian cities, and apparently sounding out the chances for successful revolt. In the definitive book on the C.I.A., *The Invisible Government*, David Wise and Thomas B. Ross indicate what the C.I.A. hoped could be gained from a revolt at this time against Sukarno's role. They state, "Many of Indonesia's political leaders, particularly those outside of Java, shared Washington's apprehension about Sukarno's compromise with the Communists, and many in the C.I.A. and State Department saw merit in supporting these dissident elements. Even if Sukarno were not overthrown, they argued, it might be possible for Sumatra, Indonesia's big oil producer, to secede, thereby protecting private American and Dutch holdings. At the very least, the pressure of rebellion might loosen Sukarno's ties with the Communists and force him to move to the right. At best, the army headed by General Abdul Haris Nasution, an anti-communist, might come over to the rebels and force wholesale changes to the liking of the United States."

Apparently Allen Dulles' visit bore fruit, because on March 30, 1958, in the city of Padang in Sumatra, a revolutionary council was proclaimed under the leadership of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, a right-wing Moslem leader and a former governor of the Bank of Indonesia. This rebel government announced that it had been formed to prevent the country's takeover by the Communists, and appealed directly to America and Great Britain for aid. In the initial stages of this revolt, the U.S. government piously disclaimed any responsibility or connection with the rebellious right-wing leaders. On April 30, 1958, Eisenhower, at a press conference, made the following statement regarding the Indonesian

rebellion: "Our policy is one of careful neutrality and proper deportment all the way through, so as not to be taking sides where it is none of our business." John Foster Dulles, at subsequent press conferences, made even more ringing statements. However, an event was to take place on May 18, 1958, which was going to blow the cover on the C.I.A.'s role in the rebellion. On that day an American DC-6 plane, flying out of Clark Field in the Philippines on a bombing run for the rebel government, bombed a town called Ambon, in the Moluccas Islands. (Ambon is a predominantly Christian village, and at the time of the bombing more than half the villagers were on their way to the town's church for religious services on Ascension Thursday. More than twenty of them were killed in the bombing and strafing run.) On the way back to base the plane was shot down. The pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, a C.I.A. agent who had been based on Formosa until the time he was transferred to the secret rebel airfield in Clark Field in the Philippines, was captured alive, with a broken leg. This radically altered the political situation. Sukarno now had the hard proof, including documents found in Pope's plane, that the U.S. was directly involved.

The revolt subsequently was crushed. Large stores of U.S. supplies, ammunition, and guns were found in the rebel capital when it was seized by loyalist armed forces. The overt role played by the United States, as discovered by the fortuitous capture of Pope, made a deep impression on Indonesian political leaders. They realized that Washington was out to get them, and this accelerated the left-wing trend in Indonesia.

There was a slight thaw in Indonesia-U.S. relations in the early years of the Kennedy regime. (In 1961, Bobby Kennedy traveled to Djakarta and was able to win the release of Allen Pope, who had been sentenced to death.) However, by 1963, U.S.-Indonesia relations had deteriorated again. For one thing, the creation of Malaysia under British tutelage, which Sukarno viewed as an attempt to recreate a neocolonialist bastion in Asia, led him to expropriate British property. America's support of Britain on the Malaysia question contributed to a further deterioration in relations between the United States and Indonesia. This entire process was accelerated during 1964 and 1965. In March of 1964, Sukarno told the United States, "To hell with your aid!" (adding in a codicil which wasn't reported in the United States, that attempts had been made by the U.S. Ambassador to link this aid to alterations in Djakarta's policy, which Sukarno quite properly viewed as an interference in Indonesia's internal affairs). On December 31, 1964, Indonesia left the United Nations. The immediate reason was the seating of Malaysia on the Security Council, but the Indonesians also charged that the U.N. was being manipulated by right-wing neocolonialist forces under the leadership of the United

States. Sukarno talked of establishing a new U.N. composed of revolutionary nations.

THE ARMY VS. A PEOPLE'S MILITIA

In 1965 the deterioration in U.S.-Indonesia relations and the general trend to the left persisted. On August 17, 1965, Indonesia's Independence Day, Sukarno made a ringing denunciation of the entire U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, particularly in regard to Vietnam. He announced at that time that there could be no compromise with U.S. imperialism, and threw down the gauntlet to Washington. An event occurred at that Independence Day meeting which may very well have sealed Sukarno's political fate internally. For some time, the Left in Indonesia, particularly the Communist Party (P.K.I.) led by a man named Aidit, and the left wing of the Nationalist Party, had been urging Sukarno to become less dependent on the armed forces by arming a people's militia. In his August 17, 1965, Independence Day address Sukarno announced that a people's militia of several million was to be formed. The ostensible reason Sukarno gave was that it was to be used in the fight against Malaysia. However, it was generally assumed by political observers that Sukarno was strengthening his hand against the army, because the formation of such a militia would quite obviously make him inaccessible to army pressure, and thus virtually coup-proof.

The armed forces were apparently deeply alarmed by this. The staunchly anti-communist Denis Warner, who is the *Reporter* magazine's Southeast Asia correspondent, wrote on May 20, 1965, "Potentially powerful groups of Indonesians still say they are determined to move before the point of no return has been reached. There are signs of disaffection among certain army commanders."

The Indonesian army was famous for its corruption, importing cars illegally, selling them at large profit, etc. The *U.S. News and World Report*, a source which can hardly be considered left-wing, stated on March 26, 1966, "Indonesia's generals are known as bright but arrogant, arbitrary and often brutal members of the privileged class. For years, most Indonesian military leaders have lined their pockets through graft and corruption." This made the generals somewhat implausible saviors of the nation, and if they were going to move against Sukarno, they apparently decided that they could not do so overtly.

It should be pointed out that the U.S. maintained excellent contact with these generals, mainly through the C.I.A. Max Frankel wrote on March 13, 1966, in the *New York Times*, "The United States continued to retain excellent contacts with the top military leaders, even after Mr. Sukarno

had renounced American aid and had begun to move against American information libraries, the Peace Corps, and news correspondents."

It appears that by the middle of September, 1965, the army had decided that things were getting out of hand. If they were ever going to move against Sukarno, it would have to be now, before the formation of the people's militia. On September 21, 1965, there was a meeting in Djakarta of the top military leaders in Indonesia, including the entire armed forces chiefs-of-staff. This meeting was secretly tape-recorded by two agents of Foreign Minister Subandrio's intelligence network, and the tape recording was given to Sukarno. It revealed that the generals had decided at this meeting that they were going to overthrow Sukarno on the pretext of his ill health. (Sukarno suffered from a bad kidney condition and had been ailing for some time.) They would then take over the government, keep Sukarno in protective custody, and maintain him as a figurehead, while effective control would be firmly in their hands.

Sukarno was deeply alarmed by the revelations in this tape recording, and he called in one of his most trusted aides, a man named Lt. Col. Untung. Untung was the commandant of the palace guard, whose duty it was to protect Sukarno. He was a non-political man, with no affiliations left or right, but intensely devoted to Sukarno, whom he viewed as the founder of the nation. Untung decided that action would have to be taken quickly, because the September 21 meeting revealed that the armed forces commanders intended to stage their coup d'etat against Sukarno on October 5, which was Armed Forces Day. At that time all the top military units would be in Djakarta for a massive military parade, and it was generally assumed that this would be their best time to move.

Untung went to a number of pro-Sukarno political leaders for aid, including Aidit of the Communist Party. Aidit flatly refused to believe him. He couldn't conceive of the generals taking such a risky ploy as an open move against Sukarno, and refused to give any assistance. However, one military man who was loyal to Sukarno was Air Marshal Omar Dhani, who was the Commandant of the Indonesian Air Force. Untung and Dhani together, using small contingents of hand-picked men they knew were loyal to Sukarno, staged a preventive coup against the generals on the night of September 30, 1965. Units loyal to Untung and Dhani took over the radio station and several other strategic points in Djakarta. It was announced over the radio that a new revolutionary council had been formed, including cabinet ministers such as Subandrio, the purpose of which was to defend the President against what they called "a council of generals formulated by the C.I.A." It should be noted that the C.I.A.'s involvement with this Council of Generals was stressed repeatedly in the broadcast. Six of the top army generals involved in the conspiracy were

murdered by units loyal to Dhani and Untung. However, one of the top generals, Abdul Haris Nasution, one of the leading movers of the anti-Sukarno movement, escaped with a flesh wound and managed to flee to the outskirts of Djakarta. There he was joined by General Suharto, one of his allies, who was in command of the crack Siliwangi Division. With this elite division in his hands he was able to move into Djakarta. After a fierce fire fight, the pro--Sukarno troops were driven from the radio station and Suharto took over the city, reasserting effective control.

Sukarno, during all this, had gone to the Halin Air Force Base on the outside of the city to await word of the coup. When he found out that it had been a failure, he fled to the summer palace at Bogor.

THE RIGHT-WING TAKES OVER

When the generals crushed the coup, they realized that events had played beautifully into their hands. Now they had effective control, without the risky necessity of openly defying Sukarno. What they proceeded to do, with the radio and the media of mass communication now in their hands and Sukarno virtually a prisoner in his summer palace at Bogor, was to take over the government, assure the people that there had been no C.I.A.--promoted Council of Generals, and liquidate left-wing opposition.

Events since then have moved quickly. We have seen that despite one abortive attempt in February to reassert his control, Sukarno is now no more than a puppet figurehead, held in house arrest at the summer palace in Bogor, his speeches tape recorded so he can't say anything damaging to the generals. We have seen the liquidation of the P.K.I. and the left wing of the Nationalist Party. Indonesia is now ruled effectively by a triumvirate. One of its members is Adam Malik, a former leader of the Murba Party, which Sukarno banned as a C.I.A. front. Another is General Suharto, work-ing closely with General Nasution. The third is the right-wing Sultan of Jogjakarta. These three men are now the Indonesian government. They have announced their intention to rejoin the U.N., to establish positive relations with the United States, to end the drive toward socialism, and protect what they call private investment.

It should be stressed again, as I tried to make clear in the initial stages of this talk, that if Sukarno's power had been taken over by the army, and if the political situation had shifted radically from left to right, this would be merely a matter of legitimate political debate. Those of us who believe as I do that Sukarno's course, despite his erratic personality, was essentially the best one for Indonesia, could debate with those on the right who felt that the anti-communist coup had been justified by the

imperatives of the cold war. But much more has happened. One million people are dead.

I would like to read one or two brief quotes from various press sources about what actually has happened in the slaughter, organized by the C.I.A.--sponsored Council of Generals which took effective control on October 21. *Time* magazine, which generally judges the virtue of governments by the number of communist scalps dangling from their belts, nevertheless objectively reported on December 17 that "Communists, red sympathizers and their families are being massacred by the thousands. Backlands army units are reported to have executed thousands of Communists after interrogation in remote jails. Armed with wide-bladed knives called 'parangs,' Moslem bands crept at night into the homes of Communists, killing entire families and burying the bodies in shallow graves. The murder campaign became so brazen in parts of rural East Java, that Moslem bands placed the heads of victims on poles and paraded them through villages. The killings have been on such a scale that the disposal of the corpses has created a serious sanitation problem in East Java and Northern Sumatra where the humid air bears the reek of decaying flesh. Travelers from those areas tell of small rivers and streams that have been literally clogged with bodies. River transportation has at places been seriously impeded." That is *Time* magazine speaking. Since that time, December 17, 1965, the figure has risen from approximately 300,000 dead to almost one million.

In one of the few isolated instances of press coverage given the slaughter in Indonesia, the *New York Times* May 8, 1966, Sunday Magazine ran an article by Seth S. King, its Southeast Asia correspondent. King quotes a schoolteacher in a village near Jogjakarta: "My students went right out with the army. They pointed out P.K.I. members. The army shot them on the spot along with their whole family; women, children. It was horrible ..." Seth King comments: "Surabaya, capital of East Java, and long a center of Communist activity, is laced with turbid canals. Since last October, one of the more grisly tasks of local householders living beside these canals, has been to get up each morning and push along the bodies caught near their garden landings."

The atrocities are continuing and they have elicited a rather interesting response in Washington. It was reported by Max Frankel from Washington in the *New York Times* on March 12, after the army had completely asserted its control and Sukarno's last desperate comeback attempt had been quashed, that: "The Johnson Administration found it difficult today to hide its delight with the news from Indonesia, pointing to the political demise of President Sukarno and the Communists. After a long period of patient diplomacy, designed to help the army triumph over

the Communists, officials were elated to find their expectations being realized."

As Americans, as citizens of a government which, by all reliable evidence, seems to have played at the very least a background role in the right-wing coup d'etat which has resulted in the death of almost one million people, we must at every point pressure our own government for an accounting. We must contribute in every way possible to an international investigation of these crimes. We cannot, unfortunately, bring the million dead back to life, but perhaps at the very least we can save our own souls. In closing I'd like to quote a line from Jose Marti, the great Cuban revolutionary hero of the nineteenth century. He said — and I think this is particularly applicable to Americans *vis-a-vis* Indonesia today — "He who witnesses a crime in silence, commits it."

MR. WILLIAM WORTHY

You'd never guess it from following American newspapers and newscasts, but in the modern world any right-wing government that tolerates or encourages mass murder has a short life expectancy. In their optimism about recent counter-revolutions in Indonesia, Brazil, and Africa, our editorialists and correspondents are as unrealistic today as they were in the past in predicting hopefully the imminent collapse of the Russian, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions. Already, the Indonesian generals have tipped their hand, as Eric Norden has very skillfully pointed out with his documentation, and have sealed their ultimate doom. The cheers from Washington and London are the imperial kiss of death. It's as if Governor Wallace of Alabama bestowed his blessing on Martin Luther King after bloody suppression of a riot in Watts. President Sukarno, an avowed Marxist, will eventually stage a strong comeback. He is clearly biding his time, as some of you may have read in the *New York Times* two days ago. When he re-emerges as de facto leader, he will revive the Djakarta-Peking anti-colonial axis and will take Indonesia rapidly leftward, just as Fidel Castro did for self-protection after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

As all of you must realize, the American press states as fact that the P.K.I., to which President Sukarno for years has been giving all possible encouragement, engineered a coup against a government that was going in its direction, particularly in foreign policy. This distortion of fact will eventually go the way of the prolonged distortions about Vietnam — which are rapidly being exposed, even to the American people. As Fidel Castro said recently in a speech, "Historically, no lie endures

indefinitely." The question to ask, if we want to ascertain the forces behind the coup, is: Who profited from it, and whose activities in the years before the coup were designed to achieve the results which ensued from the coup? The results, as I see them, are the halting of the leftward direction of Indonesia under Sukarno's leadership, and the breaking up of the anti-colonial Djakarta-Peking-Hanoi-Phnom Penh-Pyongyang axis.

Let me give you some background items. This is from an article that appeared in a number of papers last fall. This is from *Peace News* (London, October 15, 1965), but it also appeared in the *National Guardian* in the United States and some other papers. In a couple of paragraphs I summed up what the United States has been doing *vis-a-vis* Indonesia for quite some time, and I'm going to paraphrase the key section. Unknown to or forgotten by most Americans, the United States Navy, by only two hours, missed a head-on confrontation with Indonesian forces on the West Coast of Sumatra during the tense period of the regionalist, secessionist movements in 1957 and 1958 that Eric Norden told you about. The Eisenhower--Dulles administration had secretly ordered a troop landing on Indonesian soil. Last May 15 (1965), just after the U.S. intervened in Santo Domingo, the Indonesian *Herald*, semi-official organ of the Foreign Ministry, remi-nisced about the near miss in a long article entitled, "Lesson on Pakanbaru and Dominica." Pakanbaru is a city in Sumatra at the very center of the oil-rich area. The facts of the incident are not in dispute. Oil exports are the country's major source of foreign exchange. These next three paragraphs are a direct quote from the Indonesian *Herald* of May 15, 1965:

"On March 12, 1958, at 7 a.m., the combined forces of the Indonesian Armed Forces landed in Pakanbaru ... not only to crush foreign-supported rebellion, but also to prevent the imminent intervention by American and possibly British troops. At 9 a.m., the ships from the Seventh Fleet were sighted off the coast.

"The Commander of the Seventh Fleet flotilla, Rear Admiral Roy Benson, admitted to the press that he had consulted with the British High Command concerning possible joint operations in Indonesia ...

"Direct armed intervention by the Seventh Fleet was, in the case of Pakanbaru, prevented due to the timely intelligence report and quick action by the government in immediately landing her troops there. Otherwise, the Americans might have used the pretext of protecting the lives of several hundred foreign citizens there to land the Marines in Pakanbaru. After having landed, it was not unlikely that, as in the present case in the Dominican Republic, the American forces might stay on long

enough, with another pretext of protecting American properties, to tip the war balance on the rebels' side."

And then, in that same article in *Peace News*, I quoted the *New York Times* of February 12, 1965: "When President Sukarno threatened the Federation of Malaysia, he placed himself firmly in the path of U.S. and British efforts to contain Communist China. Washington has left active defense of Malaysia to the British Commonwealth nations and seeks to retain some influence in Indonesia, primarily in the hope of some day helping her army against the expected Communist bid for power."

This is the role that the U.S. was playing just a short year ago. And where had Sukarno been heading in this period when Washington and Djakarta were heading towards an open break in diplomatic relations? Well, I think a quotation from his Independence Day speech last August 17, made very clear the political and economic direction in which he planned to go. This, among other things, is what he said: "At the beginning of this year (1965), the Indonesian people, in defense of their rights against attacks by the U.S.A., which is giving active aid to neocolonialist Malaysia, took over United States capital ... This is an important step for the Republic of Indonesia, which on the principle of self-reliance is engaged in building its own national economy, entirely free from both imperialism and feudalism ... It would be well for the U.S. government to weigh all this, because we have the full right as a sovereign republic to nationalize or even to confiscate any foreign capital at all which is antagonistic to the Republic of Indonesia."

SHIFTS IN INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Another way of judging for yourselves who helped engineer this coup is to look at the shifts in Indonesia's policy since the events of last October. I'll just refer to them briefly. The new intention is to re-enter the United Nations. I think Sukarno's withdrawal from the United Nations was one of the most brilliant diplomatic strokes in the entire post-war period. I saw him just two weeks later, January 18, 1965, at his palace at Bogor — I had an interview with him — and he was absolutely delighted by the storm and the new thinking that he had stirred up all over the world by his sudden withdrawal from that American-dominated international organization.

The new line *vis-a-vis* Malaysia, another basic shift in policy, is getting cheers from all the right-wing columnists in this country and in the Western world in general, such as Joseph Alsop's column yesterday in the *Boston Globe*.

Another shift is the fact that Djakarta is no longer the safe, automatic

and hospitable haven for all liberation movements and all anti-colonial organizations including, sooner or later, I'm convinced, if events had not gone the way they did last October, Negro American organizations. Some of us used to sit around Press House in Djakarta last year (before the coup, of course) and speculate in a joking way which U.S. building, which by that time would have been confiscated, would be the Southeast Asia headquarters for S.N.C.C. (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) or for some liberation organization from Harlem or Watts.

Sukarno and Subandrio made it very clear that, without exception, Indonesia was the home for all liberation movements that need a temporary haven. Around December, the Afro-Asian Journalists Association moved its secretariat from Press House in Djakarta, where it had had full governmental cooperation up until the time of the coup, to Peking. In the months between October and December, something like three hundred Indonesian journalists had been arrested, tortured, and imprisoned.

Another shift we see is that U.S. newsmen, who in many cases can be called the unofficial representatives of empire, just as the *Times* of London correspondents back in the good old days of the British Empire were also the unofficial representatives of Empire — these U.S. newsmen are now back in Indonesia in full propaganda array, writing disparagingly of President Sukarno. But I think they're premature in counting him out completely. As they say in many parts of Asia and Africa today: When you see an American correspondent, you see the Stars and Stripes.

NEWS OF THE MASSACRE DELAYED AND MINIMIZED

One thing worth noting is the long delay in bringing to the American people the facts about the massacre in Indonesia. The facts were brought to the attention of at least the readers of the *New York Times* and the more important papers. I don't know how well the papers out in the provinces treated this news. I rather doubt that it got the sensational and continuous coverage that the execution of about five hundred of Batista's notorious torturers and murderers got in those same papers in 1959. Five hundred versus a million innocent people.

When the first story broke in the *New York Times* on January 13, 1966, what interested me was that it had taken so long for the *Times* to get around to bringing out this sordid information. The correspondent who wrote the initial story was Anthony Lewis, who used to cover the Supreme Court, and is now head of the London Bureau of the *Times*. The *New York Times* story did not appear until January 13 of this year.

The London *Sunday Times* of January 2 had brought out many of the same facts. That's the *Sunday Times*. The *Times* of London of January 8 had an article en-titled, "Mass Killings of Indonesia Communists Continue." Yet it was not until January 13, a full eleven days after the London *Sunday Times* story and a full five days after the *Times* of London story that Tony Lewis filed his dispatch to the *New York Times*. And for those American correspondents in different parts of the world who read other than English, there are even earlier dispatches by the French News Agency and other news agencies around the world. How is it that a very able correspondent such as Tony Lewis would take so long to file a well-documented story?

I think, very briefly, one can say the atmosphere is just not propitious in this country for a correspondent rushing to bring this kind of news to the attention of the American people. In a phrase, we do have — or the American press does have — a double standard when it comes to who is being executed, who is being murdered and tortured. The unprecedented savagery of the events in Indonesia since last October is another reason that I, personally, believe that the C.I.A. played a major role. The treatment of political opponents in Indonesia since 1949 has been remarkably lenient and remarkably civilized for a country that has gone through as much as Indonesia has gone through for the past three hundred years, and particularly since 1945 and the two Dutch "police actions" from 1945 to 1949. All kinds of neocolonialist intervention, all kinds of efforts to overthrow Sukarno, all kinds of efforts to assassinate the leaders of Indonesia. And yet what few political prisoners there were in Indonesia, mostly right-wing, no matter how openly they were identified with the Western colonial powers, were very decently treated under the various cabinets and governments headed by President Sukarno.

This savagery that we've seen in Indonesia is, thus, something new for that country. It is something alien, something that has been imported from a country which is now training assassins to go to all parts of the world to get rid of inconvenient political dissidents, people who don't follow the American line.

One of the several, and I emphasize *several*, Achilles' heels of the C.I.A. is its assumption that everyone, everywhere, especially if not Anglo-Saxon, is for sale. As Eric Norden told you, the United States in 1963 tried to bribe the Sukarno government with a huge offer of American economic aid if only he would abandon his policy of confrontation with Malaysia. In other words, the taxpayers of the United States were to pay out of their hides in order to save this obviously contrived new nation of Malaysia, which the *Times* of London itself

admitted was first formulated in the British Colonial Office. Sukarno also told his people last spring that a direct offer to bribe him personally had been made by American agents. I cite this because I think that this is going to be one of the undoings of the C.I.A. — because they completely fail to realize that there is such a thing as nationalism and pride of country and patriotism in the newly independent countries. By failing to recognize it, they are going to fall badly on their faces in Indonesia and elsewhere around the world.

Parenthetically, I might add that another Achilles' heel of the C.I.A. is its racism and its unconscious assumption that all non-whites are stupid and undiscerning.

PROTEST MEETING AN ENCOURAGING BEGINNING

I want to say one brief word about the meeting here tonight. As I walked in and saw the size of the audience, by contrast, it brought back memories of the rather pathetic early protests in this country against the war in Vietnam. I think the size of the audience tonight is very encouraging. It was impossible to organize any large meeting on Vietnam until after the bombing of North Vietnam began in February 1965. Kennedy made his basic escalation in December 1961. For over three years you couldn't get the American people aroused about what this country was doing in Vietnam. This came only after Americans in large numbers awoke to the danger to their own skins, only after the bombings of the North began.

And so I say, I think it's very encouraging that this number of people would turn out to this initial protest meeting. This pioneering meeting will be to the crimes in Indonesia what the Open Letter to President Kennedy early in 1963 was to the building of the protest movement against the war in Vietnam. I'm also glad that Youth Against War and Fascism is "thinking big" by placing yesterday's ad in all editions of the *New York Times*, including the international edition in Paris. We're not beginning this protest movement as we began the protest movement against the war in Vietnam, in dingy little halls where half the audience is F.B.I. agents, and where nobody of significance is paying any attention. I think Y.A.W.F. is very farsighted in calling the issue initially to the attention of a large and important reader-audience through the advertisement in the *New York Times*. And I might say also that it's obvious to me, since I've had some experience in the mechanics of meetings, that the organizers of this meeting worked extraordinarily hard to assure its success.

I think it's wise to call Indonesia a "second U.S. front," as the literature

you got from Y.A.W.F. is doing — to call it a second U.S. front in Asia, and to invoke now the ultimate possibility of a disastrous American military intervention in Indonesia, which has six *Times* the population of South Vietnam, and which sprawls over 3,000 inhabited islands, the distance of California to Maine or the distance of London to Cairo. I'm convinced the American people don't want any more Vietnams, whether in Indonesia, Brazil, or West Africa.

In the *Boston Globe* yesterday there was a very good letter from what sounds like an ordinary Joe, and I just want to read it to you because I think this is an indication of how public opinion is beginning to go *vis-a-vis* America's policy of intervening militarily in what Mr. Rusk has told us is some forty-odd countries to whose "defense" we are supposed to be committed unilaterally. This is an indication that Americans are waking up, as the French woke up in their colonial wars in Indochina and in Algeria. If persons such as those who organized this meeting tonight do their job properly, I think we can be spared some of these tragedies that Mr. Dulles — I mean Mr. Rusk — has in mind for us. That was not exactly an inappropriate slip of the tongue. I was talking on the phone Monday to a former American ambassador to an Asian country who's in very bad disfavor at the White House right now because of his position on the war in Vietnam. He served under Mr. Rusk, first under Kennedy and then under Johnson, and he said that Rusk is as bad as Dulles, in fact worse, because he doesn't have Dulles' self-confidence. And he said that Mr. Rusk's mother was scared by John Bricker before he was born, and that his reactions to all these issues are automatic, given that prenatal conditioning, and that there is no hope for ending the war in Vietnam until the war is taken out of Mr. Rusk's hands.

Well, this letter by a man named J. Eastman, in yesterday's *Boston Globe*, reads as follows: "That asinine slogan, 'We support our boys in Vietnam' gives me stomach ulcers. I am no 'disheveled beatnik punk.' During World War II, I spent five years in the U.S. Army. My two brothers and I were overseas for a total of nine years during that war."

Then he goes on to say that he endorsed that war. "Today I certainly support my nephews who are in Vietnam. This does not mean that I approve in any way the fact that they are there, nor am I soft on Communism. I have made my position on Communism very clear, publicly and in print. If my nephews manage to live through the current and totally unnecessary war, and to bring up children of their own, will my grandnephews wind up in some other useless war in some other hitherto unheard of spot on the globe? Believe me, if I am still around, I intend to give them, my grand-nephews, very careful instructions on the burning of draft cards."

I would strongly urge you to write to the Indonesian Embassy in Washington or to the Consulate here in New York — it's listed in the phone book here — and get copies of Sukarno's Independence Day Speech last year and previous years, and whatever other speeches and statements and writings of his are available. I heard that the Counsel General was due to be here at the meeting tonight.

One disagreement that I have with Eric Norden is his reference to what Sukarno said on August 17 in his speech about establishing a popular militia. I disagree with Eric's seeming implication that Sukarno really didn't approve of the idea when Aidit, the P.K.I. leader, first proposed it early in 1965 to Sukarno. My impression is that Sukarno moved on all such issues as rapidly as he could bring Indonesian public opinion along with him. He was very much aware of the right-wing Moslem sentiment in the country. He was also very much aware of his right-wing, pro-American generals, and he always tried to have enough mass support behind him before he initiated such drastic measures as launching a militia which would have very definitely challenged the power of the army in the Indonesian political spectrum. Two days ago the *Times* quoted Sukarno on May 31 — let me read the whole dispatch, a Reuter's dispatch out of Djakarta—: "President Sukarno made his discontent with the course of events in Indonesia clear today with the comment, "I am keeping my mouth shut, now, in one thousand languages." Speaking at a public ceremony, he added that 'With God's will,' he would pour out 'all my feelings in the future.' "

WILL U.S. INTERVENE TO SALVAGE COUNTER-REVOLUTION?

When the position of the Indonesian generals begins to deteriorate, as it will, I hope that Indonesia will be spared a U.S. military intervention designed to salvage the counter-revolution. Whether Indonesia is spared such an intervention will partly depend on how well we do our job of bring-ing the facts before the American people. We may not have too much time. It may be a matter of months. It may be several years. But I think the basic thing is whether or not we do our job, so that neither Mr. Rusk nor Mr. McNamara nor Mr. Bundy nor L.B.J. can manipulate this country into what would be a disaster of six times the proportions of what we're already in in Vietnam.

This is my press card from the Afro-Asian summit conference at Bandung in 1955. Here also is my press card of a year ago, April 1965, at Dasawasa in Djakarta. That was the tenth anniversary celebration of that important Asian-African conference, the first Asian-African conference in the post-war period. This second card, from April 1965, has a big "A" on the front, "AA" for Afro-Asia, and then a big "A" down at

the bottom — which meant first-class press facilities available to the holder of such "A" cards. I was about the only American in Indonesia who got an "A" card. The wire-service correspondents and other American newsmen got "B" cards — "B," or second-rate facilities. Another conference (Indonesia was becoming famous for its anti-colonial conferences), another conference that President Sukarno had in mind for this year, the twenty-first anniversary of Indonesia's proclamation of independence was CONEFO, the Con-ference of New Emerging Forces. He defined the new emerging forces as the Communist countries, the nationalist forces in the new countries, and "progressive forces in the capitalist countries." And in a speech last year he said, "As a man who has eaten the salt of struggle, I know that imperial-ism has never surrendered voluntarily. They only surrender if they are forced to do so, that is, forced by a mighty and tremendous power, by a national and international power-forming and power-application. Herein lies the significance of CONEFO; for through it we will bind together all international revolutionary forces. I always start from the stand that it is imperialism which needs us, not we who need the imperialists."

My hunch is that CONEFO will almost surely be postponed from its originally scheduled date of this summer, 1966. I might be wrong on this. Sukarno may go ahead and hold it in any event, but my suspicion is that he won't, given the atmosphere in Djakarta at the moment. But Sukarno has a sense of history and a very keen sense of the future. If you read his writings, starting in the twenties, you will recognize his ability to perceive decades ahead what is going to take place. He will continue to bide his time and to wait for the generals to destroy themselves in the eyes of the Indonesian people. Unless the C.I.A. manages to assassinate him, Sukarno will one day hold his CONEFO Conference. By then, those American reporters whose dispatches from Djakarta you are now reading in the American press may be permanently banned from the country and won't even get "B" press cards. I personally look forward to being on hand for the CONEFO and to again receiving an "A" card — "A" for anti-colonial.

PROFESSOR ANDREW MARCH

Youth Against War and Fascism saw a letter I wrote to the *New York Times* and they asked me to speak, though I told them I'm not an expert on Indonesia. So I'm not interested in blaming Sukarno, the Moslems, the P.K.I., the C.I.A., or China or anyone else, or in speculating about how or why it happened that 200,000 to a million people have been killed in Indonesia. We may never really be sure of the facts. What I want to talk about is our reaction, which shows a lot about our attitudes toward

Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, the newspapers and the administration don't invent these attitudes. They select them out of American minds with American acquiescence.

The most striking reaction is that we find it all quite bearable and matter of course. In a way, this is very reasonable, because "getting excited is not going to do those people any good." But even though our war on Hitler didn't do the European Jews much good, many people felt that the fate of the Jews was the one unanswerable reason for denouncing and opposing Nazism. And executions in Cuba, and those accompanying collectivization in the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam, are often pointed to with horror as reasons for counting these countries our enemies; reasons, we are told, that it would be immoral to forget. Our response to what has happened in Indonesia, so far as we notice it at all, is half-concealed glee. Thus the *U.S. News and World Report* in its issue of June 6 has an article with the title "Indonesia: 'Hope ... Where Once There Was None.'" And Jean Wetz, in *Le Monde* of May 6, describes the elimination of the P.K.I. as a hopeful augury of a period in which democratic aspirations will regain ascendancy over an exacerbated nationalism.

As far as Americans are concerned, the war in Vietnam to the north must have a lot to do with blunting our sensibilities, and right now we can't afford to look too closely at the notion that killing large numbers of people is a feasible and acceptable way of ushering in a hopeful period of democratic peace and progress. And militarily, I suppose we feel better in the Indochinese Peninsula without the chance of a Communist Indonesia at our backs. So whatever our rationale for Vietnam is, it goes for Indonesia too. Some, at least, of these several hundred thousand people were potential allies of the Vietcong and potential enemies of the United States.

We have other excuses, no prettier, for ignoring the massacre. There is the feeling that they asked for it, and we would be happy to believe that, barring a few excesses, all the people killed were Communists; and that they are the guilty ones because they tried, or were on the verge of trying to take over the country and conduct their own massacre. Whatever their plans may actually have been, imagine our virtuous indignation — which I certainly would have shared — if the Communists had got power and decapitated, say, 10,000 of their opponents along with their families! There would have been a crisis for the cause of democracy and freedom, one in which we would undoubtedly have considered intervening.

Another thing that's worth wondering — what if they had been

Americans or Europeans? Think how aghast we would be at an upheaval in Italy or England in which hundreds of thousands of people were executed; or how horrified we are to read of the Terror in the French Revolution, when about 40,000 people died. But, whether we say it or not, we feel that life is cheap in Asia. Those people are so miserable, so ground down, they don't care if they live or die. They're fatalistic, they're Buddhists or something, they think living is unreal and doesn't matter, they're fanatics; and there are so many of them, if the Malthusian checks don't operate one way, they'll operate another. However it works out in detail, we have behind us centuries of pseudo-explanations letting us hang on to the convenient feeling that Asians are less than people, that they have no sense of individual worth or freedom, and so are "cheap" by comparison with us Americans and Europeans.

Our reaction to this business in Indonesia makes clear the hypocrisy of what we're doing in Southeast Asia. We're supposed to be championing individualistic democracy and self-determination, whatever exactly that may mean in the context. But we are quite ready to welcome a "final solution" to the inconvenience of Indonesian Communism; and we don't mind demonstrating that we think of the Southeast Asians as shifting masses of good guys and bad guys, while despising their individual opinions and lives.

MR. MARK LANE

We're gathered here this evening to consider one of the most terrible events of a century that has abounded in mass inhuman activity. The massacre of more than half a million citizens of Indonesia is almost unrivaled in the annals of modern history when we consider the speed and therefore the organization and efficiency with which this deed was accomplished.

One familiar with the Nuremberg trial record, or with the considerable body of literature that has developed since that time, is aware of the mechanical difficulties facing those who wish to commit mass murder in a so relatively short period of time. I believe that a reading of that literature and that record would reveal that the Nazis were not as efficient or as successful in terms of the numbers murdered in any given period as those responsible for the slaughter in Indonesia. I know that it may be unpardonable to charge the German state with inefficiency, but an examination of the existing data permits no conclusion other than that the Indonesian effort was far more skillfully organized and carried out.

As I read the American press accounts of the change in government and the accompanying genocide, I began to wonder if we have really

become so inured to brutality that mass murder of innocent human beings could appear almost as a footnote to a story describing the ill-concealed glee in official Washington circles regarding the totality of events. Surely, no one can expect compassion from government leaders who daily dispatch cargos of death in the form of napalm and high explosives upon the people of Vietnam. One can expect little humane response from the leadership that authorizes the use of poison gas, referred to, of course, as non-toxic. Yet it kills, as we have seen, so that human, plant, and animal life may wither and die in North Vietnam and in those areas of South Vietnam which are suspected of resistance to the military dictator presently in favor in our capital. Even so, such callous disregard for the indescribable activities in Indonesia must bring with it some surprise.

And where are those enterprising journalists to focus attention upon this subject? And where are those in Congress who solicit our vote in the name of decent government, but who now remain silent in the face of this incredible indecency? They seem to be nowhere. In this context, the initiative of Youth Against War and Fascism and of the sponsors of this meeting, merits special commendation — for it is in their too few hands that the national conscience of America reposes at this sad moment in our history.

SUSPICIONS OF C.I.A. ROLE

It has been amply charged in the European press and, indeed, by former leaders in Indonesia itself, that the Central Intelligence Agency played a major role in the events that transpired in Djakarta and elsewhere. While I'm not unfamiliar with the unfortunately scant material, I'm not persuaded that there exists sufficient evidence upon which one may certainly base such a charge. Clearly, there is no evidence that precludes that possibility; and the expressions of official delight in Washington give further support to those who see a relationship between the events in Indonesia and our own C.I.A. — as do the known activities and stated goals of the C.I.A. prior to the massacre.

Today, international relationships function in an atmosphere heavy with suspicion. Neutral countries, India as one example, are giving serious consideration to withdrawing cooperation from the Fulbright Scholarship program and from the entire concept of exchange of professors; although the advantages to India of such a program are apparent. The stated reason for the reluctance to continue — fear that the C.I.A. has taken over the entire program. If Michigan State University permitted itself to be used as a front for the C.I.A. in training secret police for Vietnam, what guarantee can there be that that agency has not infiltrated other and

seemingly more susceptible areas of related work? It is not enough to lament the suspicion that exists or to wish for a better day and a healthier atmosphere. It is necessary to locate the cause of suspicion, and that can be accomplished with little difficulty.

The emergence of the C.I.A. as a major policy-making force of our government, and its primary spy agency as well, have so interwoven the two aspects of governmental responsibility that they are now no longer distinguishable. Diplomacy and normal relationships between countries, whether friendly, neutral, or hostile, become impossible when it is not clear whether the exchange is with a diplomat, that is, a representative of the American government, or with a spy; or worse — one actively engaged in initiating or paying for the initiation of a coup against the very party involved in the discussion.

DELIBERATE SUPPRESSION OF THE FACTS BY THE PRESS

For the C.I.A. is, of course, more than an intelligence agency. It is an agency which establishes its own policy and then seeks to carry it out; sometimes, as in the case of the despoiled Cuban sugar, behind the back of the President. In that particular instance, you will recall the *New York Times* belatedly revealed that the operation was designed with special safeguards so as to prevent President Kennedy from learning about it, out of fear that he would have halted the program had he known of it. Kennedy did learn of the attempt and did prevent the C.I.A. from executing its project. That *New York Times* revelation, as well as those more recently published there, show the *Times* to be a more responsible journal than most others. Yet, as the *Times* itself demonstrated again today, one cannot rely upon it for full and timely disclosure. Page 14 of today's *Times* carries a remarkable series of excerpts from an address delivered yesterday by Clifton Daniel, managing editor of the *Times*, to the World Press Institute, regarding discussions on the *Times*' news policy and the information it suppressed in respect to the Bay of Pigs invasion. Mr. Daniel, in seeking to rebut Arthur Schlesinger's charge that the *Times* deliberately misled its readers, admitted that the *Times*, knowing that the invasion was being planned, financed and directed by the C.I.A., suppressed that fact and informed its readers only of the participation of the anti-Castro Cuban exiles. Schlesinger, admitting that his conduct in seeking to kill the story was less than proper, asked, according to today's *Times*, and I quote Mr. Schlesinger, "If I was reprehensible in misleading the *Times* by repeating the official cover story, the *Times* conceivably was just as reprehensible in misleading the American people by suppressing the Tad Szulc story from Miami. I at least had the excuse that I was working for the government." Mr.

Schlesinger's defense, comprised of rather curious logic, seems to be that so long as you are on the public payroll and the taxpayers are paying your salary, you have a duty to prevent them from getting the facts. The one central fact that emerges from this joint confessional of the *Times* and Mr. Schlesinger for the government, is that the *Times* and the government conspired together to prevent the truth about the C.I.A.'s involvement from being known. In those circumstances, may we safely rely upon either the government or the media for the facts about the possibility of C.I.A. participation in the Indonesian events? I think not. As those are our two normal sources for information about American governmental operation, it is clear that a new source must be located or developed in this instance.

Another and closer example of press and governmental cooperation to prevent the facts from reaching the people may be found in a matter that has occupied me for the past two and a half years. The myth that one lone unhappy man was responsible for the death of President Kennedy was developed by the government, beginning with the Dallas police, continued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency; endorsed by President Johnson's Commission and then sold by the uncritical and accepting press. I'm confident that within three months from this evening that myth will have been forever put to rest; and the American people and, indeed, segments of the Congress will begin to demand adequate answers about that tragedy.

This will come about despite the endorsement of the report offered so shamefully by the media. Along those lines, I offer one brief example. The one-volume Warren Commission Report was issued in September, 1964. It purported to fairly and accurately summarize the information contained in some twenty-six volumes of testimony and exhibits. While the twenty-six volumes had not yet been published, the press endorsed the Report as a fair summary of that which they had never seen. Two months later, the twenty--six volumes, containing hundreds of thousands of words, were issued. On the very day that they were issued, Anthony Lewis, writing the front-page headline story for the *New York Times* stated, "The testimony in the twenty-six volumes overwhelmingly supported the conclusion of Chief Justice Earl Warren and his colleagues as revealed in the Commission's Report, September 27, that the assassination was no conspiracy, but the work of one unhappy man, Lee Harvey Oswald."

The fact is that the evidence in the volumes does quite the reverse — it proves without a doubt that every single major conclusion offered by the Commission was false, save the assertion that Ruby killed Oswald. And since that occurred on television, there was little room for maneuver with

respect to that particular event. It took me the better part of two years to read all of the evidence in the twenty-six volumes. How was it possible for Mr. Lewis to have digested it all in a matter of hours, and then to reassure the American people with an editorial comment, published as a statement of fact by the *New York Times*?

While logic did not permit that act, necessity compelled it — the necessity to quiet the doubts. Yet, falsehoods do not for long dispel doubts and contain rumors, whether they be about the assassination of an American president or American adventures abroad. And as each effort to impose a consensus from above — the very antithesis of democracy — as each such effort fails, the public has every right to place less and less confidence in the government and in the media that too often serves the wishes of the administration rather than the needs of the people. The final and total failure of the government and media in such a case is that their efforts to contain doubt prepare, instead, a fertile ground for the cultivation of rumor and speculation.

Yesterday, Mr. Daniel concluded his remarks by stating, "Up until the time we are actually at war or on the verge of war, it is not only permissible, it is our duty as journalists and citizens to be constantly questioning our leaders and our policy and to be constantly informing the people, who are masters of us all, both the press and the politicians." Those are indeed welcome words and would have permitted more jubilation had not James Reston, after having admitted to a central role in the suppression of the Bay of Pigs story, added in today's *New York Times*, "If I had to do it over, I would do exactly what we did at that time."

I take Mr. Reston at his word. If Mr. Reston knew that the C.I.A. was the moving force in the recent Indonesian takeover, would he not then advise the *New York Times* to suppress that information as well? And so we are left to our own devices to ferret out the facts. The possibility of American governmental participation in the events in Indonesia exists. The fact of that participation has not been established beyond any doubt, but the possibility of that participation is apparent.

INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION MUST BE UNDERTAKEN

Let us then agree that this matter is of primary concern and that we have an obligation to secure additional information so that the possibility may be dismissed or the charges proven. To that end, we urge the establishment of an investigative body to take statements from those who have escaped from Indonesia or from those who may still be in Indonesia and to secure data from whatever other sources may be discovered. I have been advised just today that a number of those few

giants who still grace our planet — such as Bertrand Russell, for one example — are willing to support and sponsor such an inquiry in response to the request of Youth Against War and Fascism.

The lesson of Nazi Germany is that it is not enough to say, "Well, I just didn't know. I didn't realize at the time." I support the establishment of such an inquiry because it is my belief that we have not only the right to know, but in these circumstances — should we wish to escape the universal and justified condemnation of the German people — we must understand that we have the obligation to find out.

APPENDIX

THE COUNCIL OF GENERALS (from Suara Pemuda Indonesia)

The Council of Generals is an organization of the right-wing military clique within the Indonesian army, which was founded to seize power from the hands of the legal Indonesian government. The founding of this Council of Generals was directly supported and planned together with the U.S. intelligence service, the C.I.A. Its members consist of 40 right-wing generals, among whom the important figures are General Nasution, General A. Soekendro, General Soeharto and the right-wing generals who were killed on October 1 last year. They were: General A. Yani, General Suparman, General M. T. Harjono, General Suprpto, General Sutojo, and Gen-eral Pandjaitan.

Although the Council of Generals has just been founded, the right-wing military clique within the army has existed for a long time. The founding of the Council of Generals was merely an inauguration of the power of the right-wing military clique within the army.

To make it clear, it is necessary to review the Indonesian armed forces. The Indonesian armed forces were born in the battle against Dutch colon-ialism when the revolution of August 1945 broke out. Many patriotic youth, workers, peasants, etc., in short, all patriotic elements, joined the armed struggle against the Dutch. Though equipped only with sharpened bamboo spears, they courageously defended their motherland from the aggression launched by colonialism. In such a situation, the slaves of the Dutch colonialists — the feudalists and the compradores — who were the enemies of the revolution, were worrying about their survival. They tried to smuggle into the ranks of the revolution and pretended to take part in the struggle against Dutch colonialism. But in reality, they wanted to seize state power which was then in the hands of the patriotic elements. In this attempt they enjoyed the support and secretly cooperated with the Dutch colonialists and the U.S. imperialists.

As an example, we wish to acquaint the readers with the facts on how a figure of the Council of Generals, A. H. Nasution, who was a soldier in the Dutch colonial era, came to power in the Indonesian army.

During the Dutch colonial era, Nasution had already been a graduate of a Dutch military school, the CORO (Corp Reserve Onder-Officiieren), into which only trusted servants of Dutch colonialism could enroll. In 1945, when the youth and people of Purwokerto district in Central Java seized power and captured the weapons of the Japanese fascist army, Nasution succeeded in becoming their leader. From there, step by step, Nasution tried to get the people's armed forces under his orders. After having wrested the power from the armed forces, Nasution, instead of re-sisting the Dutch colonial army, disarmed the people's troops which stub-bornly resisted the Dutch aggression. This was experienced by the popular forces in West Java.

That is just an example. Many among the members of the Council of Generals were formerly military men who were educated by the Dutch colonialists or of feudal aristocratic origin, such as Soeharto.

In spite of the attempts of the right-wing military clique to suppress popular forces or to wrest their leadership over them, these popular forces became even stronger and larger in the battlefield of the revolution. At that time there were still many armed troops which were not under the control of the right-wing military clique. These were the armed forces which were led by the Communist Party of Indonesia (P.K.I.), such as the workers troops, the Red troops, the People's troops, and troops of the Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pesindo). This made the Dutch and the American imperialists very worried. Smuggling their agents into the ranks of the revolutionary forces did not meet their need any more. This is why provocation against the communist and other progressive elements in September, 1948 (known as the Madiun Affair) was launched, after being preceded by the Red Drive Proposal put forward by the American diplomat Cochran in a negotiation (known as the Sarangan negotiation) between the reactionary government of Mohammad Hatta and the United States government. The Red Drive Proposal was aimed at liquidating the Indo-nesian communists. Nasution and the Siliwangi division took an important part in this white terror in which thousands of communists were mas-sacred. Though putting up a brave resistance, the popular forces sustained great losses, for they had to face a much stronger enemy. After the Madiun Affair, the position of Nasution and his right-wing military clique in the Indonesian armed forces became stronger.

The massacre and the hunting down of communists only paved the

way for the Dutch colonialists to launch a renewed attack against the Republic of Indonesia and to regain their colonial domination. Facts have shown that after the right-wing military clique launched a repression of communists in Madiun, the Dutch colonial troops began to attack the areas under the control of popular forces. The enemies of the revolution who were dominating the Indonesian government at that time made compromises with the Dutch colonialists in December, 1949, as a result of which Indonesia until now has been a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country.

After the conclusion of the Round Table Conference agreement which provided for the withdrawal of the Dutch colonial troops from Indonesia, in some areas popular forces still existed, whose commanders had not been liquidated in the Madiun Affair. Nasution and his right-wing military clique did not want them to be included in the Indonesian armed forces. Nasution cunningly made use of the outbreak of separatist rebellions in several parts of the country to get rid of the patriotic and progressive troops by sending them against the rebels. In all these cases, the rebel leaders had a nice cooperation with Nasution before they mounted armed rebellion against the legal government. Many patriotic soldiers and officers fell in battles against rebels in the South Moluccas (1950), in Sumatra and Sula-wesi (the P.R.R.I.-Permesta rebellion in 1957-58), and in many other places...

The Cooperation of the right-wing military clique with the other enemies of the Indonesian Revolution.

1. With Feudalism

When the Dutch colonial troops had been withdrawn from Indonesia by 1949 after having failed to suppress the independence struggle waged by the Indonesian people, the Dutch imperialists resorted to the "divide and rule" and "let Indonesians fight Indonesians" tactic. The agreement signed after the Round Table Conference in The Hague, 1949, provided for the carving up of Indonesia into small "states" ruled by local feudal overlords which were joined into a federation called the United States of Indonesia. In this way, the Dutch imperialists could control Indonesia by proxy, that is to say, through their puppets who headed the small "states." But thanks to the powerful demands of the people, the United States of Indonesia was dissolved and changed into a unitary state. The local feudalists did not agree with this development, and with the support of the Dutch and the U.S. imperialists they launched rebellions in the regions, such as the rebellion of the so-called "Republic of South

Moluccas," the "Darul Islam" and the "P.R.R.I.-Permesta." These rebellions were the rebellions of the local warlords and feudalists.

In view of the fact that the right-wing military clique did not seriously destroy the rebellion of the regional warlords, it could be crushed only in late 1964, almost 15 years later. The final destruction of the rebellion was possible only after the peasants under the leadership of the Indonesian Peasants Front (B.T.I.) together with the patriotic elements in the armed forces, waged a resolute struggle against it. Considering the stubborn struggle waged by the people, the right-wing military clique advised their rebel friends to "surrender" and they would be "pardoned." These rebels who had killed many people, communists and other patriots, were "pardoned" by their friends, the right-wing military clique of Nasution. In South Sulawesi, there were 14,000 former rebels who were incorporated into the Indonesian army to strengthen the position of the right-wing military clique.

2. The cooperation of the right-wing military clique/the Council of Generals with the bureaucratic capitalists, the compradores, corruptors, swindlers and other enemies of the revolution.

When in about 1950 the forces of the people became more and more powerful and the struggle against the Round Table Conference Agreement as a betrayal to the revolution was going on, the compradores who were in power shamelessly defended the interests of the imperialists in Indonesia. When the imperialists demanded the return of the already taken-over plantations, the right-wing military clique came to the fore as the backbone of the compradores. They intended to deliver back to the former Dutch owners the plantations abandoned by them when Japan attacked Indonesia and which, for nearly ten years, had been cultivated by the peasants. The peasants who fought against the Japanese militarists and the Dutch colonialists rightly considered the lands their own. They naturally did not want to deliver back the lands to the former Dutch owners. In response, the right-wing military clique, backed by force of arms, ran down the houses and the cultivated lands of the peasants with tractors and evicted the peasants from their own homes. Then the right-wing military clique handed the lands over to the former Dutch owners.

The Indonesian situation was developing with the Indonesian progressive forces becoming more and more powerful. Under the pressure of the people, the struggle for liberation of West Irian was reinforced. Within this framework, the people demanded the taking over of all enterprises owned by the Dutch and other imperialists supporting the Dutch colonialists. The right-wing military clique did not dare to

openly stand against the people. By taking as an excuse the existence of Martial Law they robbed the fruits of the struggle waged by the workers to take over Dutch-owned enterprises. They sent, in 1957, 450 officers of their clique to control more than 600 enterprises already taken over by the workers. Later on, the right-wing military clique also controlled the taken-over British, Belgian and other foreign enterprises. This right-wing military clique later extended their wings by controlling almost all sectors of the Indonesian economy, and this led to the birth of the class of the Indonesian bureaucrat capitalists. The right-wing military clique is in fact in the same grouping as the bureaucrat capitalists ...

3. Cooperation between the right-wing military clique/the Council of Generals and the imperialists.

The imperialists, unhappy to see the Indonesian people achieve independence, always looked for forces in Indonesia to rely upon in the framework of stepping up their subversive activities. The imperialists, for that purpose, had established cooperation with all enemies of the Indonesian revolution inside the country, including the right-wing military clique, who at this moment comes out as the Council of Generals. We have explained how the right-wing military clique came to the fore during the time when the compradore Hatta government killed Communists after having received military and financial aid from the United States imperialists. Later on, after the signing of the Round Table Conference Agreement, the imperialists actively stepped up subversive activities by supporting the re-bellions launched by the local warlord like the "Darul Islam" gangs, the "Republic of South Moluccas" rebels, the "P.R.R.I.-Permesta" rebels, etc.

The open support of the United States imperialists to the local rebellions was answered by resolute resistance on the part of the Indonesian people. Therefore, the United States imperialists regarded it necessary to reduce their open activities and took another but more covert road by making a plot with the right-wing military clique within the Indonesian army. They did this by giving "aid" and training military "experts" to strengthen the position of the right-wing military clique headed by Nasution within the Indonesian army.

The U.S. imperialists highly appreciate the right-wing military figure Nasution and call him the "strongest" and a "courageous figure." To strengthen the position of the right-wing military clique, the U. S. imperialists had given "aid" which up to 1963 amounted to 60.9 million U.S. dollars. Before the end of 1960, the United States had equipped 43 battalions of the army. Every year the United States trained officers of

the right-wing military clique. Between 1956-1959 more than 200 high-ranking officers were trained in the United States, while low-ranking officers are trained by the hundreds every year. Once the head of the Agency for International Development of America said that U.S. aid, of course, was not intended to support Sukarno, and that the U.S. had trained a great number of officers and ordinary people who would form a unit to make Indonesia a free country. By a free country he meant a country like Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and other American satellites.

The cooperation as well as the aid of the United States have greatly strengthened the position of the right-wing military clique in Indonesia. Finally in the middle of last year the U. S. imperialists suggested that the right-wing military clique take over state power. For this purpose the U.S. imperialists provided many facilities, among others a fund of 225 billion Indonesian rupiahs. Cooperation between the imperialists and the Council of Generals is channeled through the C.I.A.

The coup d'etat of the Council of Generals in October 1965

In preparing their coup d'etat, the right-wing military clique organized themselves in the Council of Generals. Since then they more actively made every preparation necessary in connection with their planned coup d'etat. The Council of Generals have dissolved organizations within the army like the League of Officers, the League of Non-Commissioned Officers, and the League of Soldiers, to ensure the smooth operation of their planned coup d'etat.

In August last year, when president Sukarno was seriously ill, the Council of Generals planned to take over state power. But confronted by the mounting revolutionary mass actions launched by the people at that time, they made a retreat and postponed their coup d'etat plan to October 5, the occasion of the Armed Forces Day. In this framework of preparation, the Council of Generals called a meeting at the Academy of Military Law on September 21. At that meeting a coup d'etat and the formation of a new government were planned, General Nasution was proposed to be the President, General A. Yani the First Premier and Minister of Defence and Security, General Harjono, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other ministries were to be distributed among the followers of the Council of Generals. The tape recording of the meeting of the Council of Generals fell into the hands of a certain Major Rudito and was delivered to President Sukarno. The Council of Generals then strengthened their position in Djakarta by deploying seven to nine battalions from West Java, East Java, and Central Java to Djakarta.

From the end of 1964 up to the coup d'etat of the Council of Generals, the Indonesian people waged a resolute struggle against the criminal manoeuvres of the enemies of the revolution. The class struggle inside the country became very sharp. In facing the criminal manoeuvres of the enemies of the revolution like the "dissolution of political parties," and the willful misinterpretation of the position of the progressive forces with regard to Pantja Sila (Indonesian state ideology) and to the unilateral actions of the peasants, etc., the Indonesian people succeeded in unmasking the real nature of the right-wing military clique and its followers. The people demanded the wiping out of the enemies of the revolution from the state apparatus. The right-wing military clique was thrown into panic. At the same time, the mounting revolutionary situation gave great encouragement to the revolutionary soldiers and officers within the army to clean from the army the right-wing military clique of the Council of Generals. They knew how the Council of Generals had instructed them to terrorize the peasants. They knew how the right-wing military clique cooperated with the U.S. imperialists. Headed by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, the patriotic officers and soldiers of the Indonesian army launched a mopping--up operation within the army, known as the "September 30 Affair." It was a pity that their efforts failed.

With the failure of Untung, the Council of Generals, who in fact had already prepared a coup d'etat on October 5, took advantage of this opportunity to achieve their goal. They accused the September 30 movement of launching a coup d'etat. Under this pretext, they launched their coup d'etat in a more covered way. An American writer therefore calls the coup d'etat of the Council of Generals an "invisible coup."

Under the pretext of crushing the September 30 movement, the clique of the Council of Generals has launched mass murder, terror, arrests, and hunted communists and other patriots. Their main target is the communists because the communists are the main barriers to achieving their goal. Later on, arrests and the persecution of other patriots followed, and on March 18, 1966, not less than 15 cabinet ministers were arrested; some of them have been murdered. How many people were killed and put into prison is difficult to know exactly, because the Council of Generals keep it secret. According to a general estimate not less than 300,000 people were murdered.

After the Council of Generals took over state power, they established a fascist regime which by force of arms is suppressing the Indonesian people. For the Indonesian students and youth there is no other way to resist them but by an armed struggle together with the Indonesian people, as is now being done by the progressive youth and students in Indonesia. Sooner or later, victory surely belongs to the people.