Yeltsin losing momentum

Congress of Peoples' Deputies shows greater resistance

By Sam Marcy (Dec. 17, 1992)
December 1 marked a significant anniversary that one might have expected would have been observed in the Russian Republic. From the perspective of a year ago, Boris Yeltsin should have had a lot to crow about. As it was, the anniversary passed with hardly any publicity, at least not in the West.

A year ago, Yeltsin eagerly proclaimed Russia's imminent assumption of the budget of the entire USSR. As president of the Russian Republic, this put him in the position of making good the debts of the USSR, including those of all the republics willing to join with Russia in this financial agreement.

Reaction of West

In the West, particularly in the United States, Yeltsin's announcement was described as an effort to bail out the Kremlin. "Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed today to bail out the virtually bankrupt central government of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev by taking over its budget and imposing across-the-board cuts." (Washington Post, Dec. 1, 1991)

This could easily have been viewed as a very bold venture and, if successful, as a turning point in the struggle to impose a so-called free market economy on the USSR and restore the capitalist system. Yeltsin's announcement came after a meeting with Gorbachev and the head of the Soviet central bank, at which all of this was agreed to.

Gorbachev's agreement was inevitable, considering the damage and confusion caused by the so-called August coup and the beginning of the dissolution of the USSR itself. The aim of this financial agreement, it should be remembered, was to merge the budgets of Russia and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, what had been the Soviet Finance Ministry would now be put under Russian control.

Yeltsin acknowledged that in consolidating the budgets, he would have to make tough decisions, but he boasted that Russia was the biggest and economically strongest of the republics. It was pointed out in the capitalist press that the Russian government had recently taken control of Soviet gold, diamond and oil resources on Russian soil.

Yeltsin also promised to absorb most Soviet ministries, particularly those controlling the economy, and to discard others. All in all, this agreement presumably meant that the Russian Republic was willing, ready, and able to absorb not only the assets of the former Soviet Union but also its considerable liabilities.

At the time the USSR was cast in the role of having become thoroughly bankrupt, both politically and economically. However, the process of the breakup of the USSR was not so much of an economic as of a political character, flowing from the growing assaults made upon the Gorbachev administration from both the extreme rightists as well as from the working class population as a whole.

Yeltsin, Gorbachev and speed of reform

It is interesting to remember that the whole course of the struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev reduced itself to the tempo at which the so-called reforms should be carried out. The reforms were bourgeois economic and administrative measures that supposedly would hasten a capitalist market economy.

Day in and day out, the differences between Gorbachev and Yeltsin were discussed. They were only supposed to be over how quickly the market economy would be introduced. Yeltsin played the role of the fast pace-setter, while Gorbachev was the laggard. This seemed to go on endlessly.

When Yeltsin became president of the Russian Republic in the spring of 1991, he seemed at last to have gotten the opportunity to prove the merits of his case. He had been elected with a huge majority, and his popularity had risen remarkably as a result of his demagogy, especially his attacks on Gorbachev, whose star had fallen. But within a short period, evidence began to accumulate that his effort to introduce a capitalist market and to decentralize state industry was meeting resistance all over the county. He was confronted with problems in the conversion from a socialist to a capitalist economy that he had not anticipated.

He changed personnel and shuffled around his top aides, but it did nothing to bring the results he expected. The economic deterioration continued.

What was Yeltsin to do? As long as he controlled only the Russian Republic, important as that was, he could not effectively put his reforms into place. The USSR, after all, had been a centralized, multinational state with a planned economy in which each of the republics was an integral part. The economics of the USSR was such that it was quite impossible to separate out the Russian Republic from the rest of the republics, especially the newly independent Ukraine, which were going their own way.

Yeltsin had been thundering about how all that was needed in Russia was a brilliant new innovator like himself to set everything straight economically, politically and socially. Within a few months, however, the same malaise that had afflicted the plans of Gorbachev was making itself felt even more strongly. Inflation was growing rapidly, and production was beginning to fall. The ugly head of unemployment was raised.

The quick fix

There's nothing like a quick fix. Hurry. Take advantage of Gorbachev's collapse and offer to take over the entire budget of the USSR, including all the republics.

And so it was that Yeltsin made his move, which was hailed in the Washington Post with the triumphant headline: "Yeltsin bails out Kremlin," and the subhead: "Russia takes over Soviet budget, expands own power."

The Washington Post wasn't the only one to consider this an important development. The Dec. 1, 1991, Wall Street Journal said, "The Russian Republic took control of the apparently bankrupt Soviet government Finance Ministry, agreeing to pay the bulk of the costs. Russian President Boris Yeltsin worked out a plan to `consolidate the Russian and Soviet budgets into one.' As of Sunday, the Russian president had assumed the payment of Gorbachev's salary."

The following day, the New York Times had this to say: "[Yeltsin's] agreement to finance the Soviet payroll and guarantee Soviet state bank credits may have seemed a little routine after the dramatic events" earlier. However, "Mr. Yeltsin's assumption of Kremlin expenses was widely welcomed. Foreign governments and investors saw a new chance for financial stability and therefore for payment of debts and potential new investment."

By taking over the financial liabilities of the USSR, Yeltsin had grown immeasurably in the eyes of the imperialist governments and the big banks. His all-too-frequent assertions that he would accelerate the pace of capitalist transformation of the USSR were the most welcome of all his declarations.

Notwithstanding the high drama of the political developments in the USSR, it is prosaic questions such as the failure to pay interest on huge loans and the budgetary process that usually interest the "investing public," the bankers and industrialists.

Yeltsin mired in difficulties

The Yeltsin government is now so mired down by the accumulating financial and economic problems caused by his reckless attempt to accelerate the privatization of socialist industry that no one can be found to celebrate this glorious anniversary of the takeover of the budget of the entire USSR.

Nor is there rejoicing in the journalistic fraternity of imperialist apologists. If anything, they now want to hide their original preference for Yeltsin as the quick pace-setter of bourgeois restoration and counterrevolution over the laggard, Gorbachev. Of course, it should be remembered that they also preferred Gorbachev over the communist leadership in place before March 1985.

Now the imperialists are faced with another dilemma. Their claim to love democracy does not extend to the only authentic popular body, the Congress of Peoples Deputies, as long as it resists the imposition of the Yeltsin program of bourgeois restoration and counterrevolution.

Congress of Peoples Deputies

On Dec. 5, the Congress of Peoples Deputies voted 1,041 to 693 to amend the Russian Constitution and thereby dilute some of the power of the executive branch of the Russian government. This was only one vote less than the two-thirds majority needed, and was a significant rebuff to the Yeltsin counterrevolutionary cabal.

The vote demonstrated Yeltsin's growing isolation not only in the Congress of Deputies, but far more significantly, throughout the length and breadth of Russia itself. So catastrophic are the effects of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the sabotage, vandalism and outright robbery by new strata of the bourgeoisie, that the anger produced had to find some echo in the Congress of Peoples Deputies.

[On Dec. 9, the Congress of Peoples Deputies rejected Yegor Gaidar as Russian prime minister. He received only 467 votes, 54 short of the needed maount. According to preliminary reports, 486 voted against him. Although this is a resounding setback for Yeltsin's program, Gaidar will be able to continue in office three months under Russian law.]

The Congress of Peoples Deputies is the only remaining representative or popular institution in Russia today. The Yeltsin cabal of bourgeois, counterrevolutionary politicians have arrogated to themselves the role of the executive branch. Occasionally, according to their own lights, they turn to the Congress of Deputies or its standing committee, the Parliament, which votes and acts on everyday matters between Congress meetings.

Recently, the course of the internal struggle in Russia, the rising tide of resentment and opposition to the economic as well as political behavior of the Yeltsin cabal, has given rise to what historically has been called "dual power." The Congress of Peoples Deputies is on one side and the utterly counterrevolutionary Yeltsin-Gaidar forces are on the other. This duality has occurred often in world history where there is an imminent outbreak of struggle between two divergent classes in society.

Historic examples of dual power

Historic examples of dual power include the struggle between the ancient nobility in 18th-century France and the rising bourgeoisie. The monarchy retained the semblance of power in one political arena and the bourgeoisie, as the Third Estate, dominated another. It's the best-known example in European history of the existence of dual power, which ultimately leads to the destruction of one or the other contending class.

An American version should be more familiar: the growing struggle between the northern bourgeoisie and the southern slaveocracy in the 19th century. The two classes kept contending with each other over several decades until the "irrepressible conflict" broke out into the Civil War.

In classical historical examples of dual power, one group or class retains the legal or de jure power while de facto power passes to the other class.

What is the historic class situation in Russia at the present time? Who holds de facto power? And who merely holds de jure power?

In order to find the answer we have to look historically at the Congress of Peoples Deputies. This body is the descendant of the Congress of Soviet Deputies. That congress met and enacted a constitution on July 10, 1918, which contains the following:

"Chapter I.1. Russia is hereby proclaimed a republic of soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies. All power centrally and locally is vested in these soviets.

"Chapter I.2. The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the principle of a free union of free nations as a federation of Soviet national republics....

"Chapter II.3. Its fundamental aim being abolition of all exploitation of man by man, complete elimination of the division of society into classes, merciless suppression of the exploiters, socialist organization of society and victory of socialism in all countries."

As many times as it has been amended, the essence of these statements has been retained in the constitution. None of the laws passed at a later date abrogated or abolished these paragraphs or even amended them in such a way as to eliminate the essential elements of the provisions.

The Gorbachev administration began the attempt to scuttle the Congress of Soviet Deputies and whittle down its power. The aim was to make the congress a mere rubber-stamp of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin counterrevolutionary cabal of bourgeois politicians, who had been nurtured in the arms of the bureaucratic state and party apparatus. The congress's working-class social base was eroding and being replaced by a new layer of bourgeois industrial managers.

Gorbachev reflected in part the collective farm aristocracy with its inclination to the capitalist market. The industrial manager Yeltsin more and more clearly reflected the privatization urge of the industrial, technological and managerial aristocracy. Both moved the country in the direction of counterrevolution. The deepening crisis caused by Gorbachev's continued attempt to push his capitalist reforms further and further accelerated the process and lifted Yeltsin into the public eye as the new Soviet leader.

There then followed a series of very damaging steps by the Yeltsin administration that foreshadowed the dismantling of Soviet industry and the intimidation of the Congress of Peoples Deputies. For a while it looked like the Peoples Deputies would remain a rubber stamp for the Yeltsin cabal after Gorbachev's demise.

But the plight of the workers, the peasants, of the general population has set the counterrevolution back.

Yeltsin's inability to improve on Gorbachev has been followed by an even more severe setback. Not only has he failed to improve the economic conditions of the population, but his effort to break up the Soviet Union as a whole, as well as the Communist Party and fraternal organizations, has helped to discredit him. Thus arose the specter of dual power, as the Congress of Peoples Deputies regained some confidence.

Here it is necessary to discuss the character of the structural changes attempted by the Yeltsin cabal and the attempt to undermine the congress.

Model of Paris Commune

Since the day when the Congress of Soviet Deputies established the power of the workers and peasants, Soviet power was based on the model of the Paris Commune.

The Commune was a vastly superior, more revolutionary form of state. One of the fundamental bulwarks of the Commune was that it combined legislative and executive authority in one common body politic, the Commune, the workers' parliament. Separating executive from legislative work, as in most bourgeois governments, removes the executive branch from the authority of the masses.

A critical examination of the historic evolution of parliamentary as against executive branches of the capitalist state evinces a clear tendency. The executive grows at the expense of the legislature and tends to reduce the legislature, however democratic it may be, to the level of a talking shop.

This is particularly evident in the most powerful capitalist countries, like the U.S., where even today the executive can send off an entire army, once again in an undeclared war, without the sanction of or even a hearing at the legislative level. This has happened without deviation from the wars in Korea and Vietnam to the interventions in Yugoslavia and Somalia.

Karl Marx's foresight in his brilliant analysis of the Paris Commune was in recognizing the seemingly innocuous provision of combining these two functions. Lenin equally took note of it.

The Commune was elected by universal suffrage, but it did not hold an election for a president or executive. The democratic imperialist bourgeoisie usually hold an election for president, whose term in office is generally longer than the term of those elected to the legislative branch. Such a president holds the real authority.

The Commune had none of that. Neither did the Congress of Soviet Deputies in its early days. It did not establish an executive over and above the legislative branch. Of course, like the Commune, the congress could be abused illegally.

During sessions of the Congress, the representatives establish bodies and choose governing deputies to function in-between sessions. Every ranking national official of the Soviet government was a deputy of the Congress, subject not only to reelection or ouster but to recall at any time during his or her tenure.

Notwithstanding the decay of Soviet institutions, there was no separate, independent executive branch elected over and above the Congress of Soviet Deputies until the arrival of the counterrevolutionary destruction and dissolution of the Soviet Union. Thus, from a strictly legal point of view, holding a presidential election for Yeltsin outside of the constitutional framework of the Congress of Deputies is illegal and contrary to the framework and constitution of the Congress of Peoples Deputies.

Yeltsin's role as president, plus his amassing of a growing number of bourgeois politicians in a so-called executive branch, is a break from the fundamental organization of the Soviets as a workers' state.

Congress popular but vacillating

The Congress of Peoples Deputies is still the pole of attraction so far as the masses go in the struggle against blatant, open counterrevolution. The masses still look to the Congress. Otherwise, Yeltsin would have dissolved it or, in case of its recalcitrance, moved to rule altogether by decree, that is, by personal dictatorship.

This by no means signifies that the Congress of Peoples Deputies is a thoroughgoing, consistent representative of the proletariat and the collectivized peasantry. Far, far from it. It compromises the interests of the proletariat. But it is the legal repository of the socialization of property, of the socialized state sector, of the ownership of the means of production by the workers.

Despite all the ravages and destruction of socialist practices and the elimination of economic and political gains, there is this one indispensable element of socialism that remains: the socialization of the property, that is, of the means of production. Yeltsin himself recognizes this only too well.

In a remark calculated to be derogatory of socialism, he says, "If one puts the theory and practice of socialism side by side and compares them with an unprejudiced eye, it becomes clear that of all its classic elements, the only one that has been put into effect is the socialization of property." (Against the Grain, by Boris Yeltsin)

Indeed, no matter how he tries to discredit socialism, he knows that the socialization of property, meaning of the basic means of production, is what the struggle is about right now. This is the bone that sticks in his throat. It is this that he and his counterrevolutionary cabal are trying to overcome.

This is what the struggle is about between the Congress of Peoples Deputies and the outright counterrevolution. The struggle is about who owns the property, the assets built up by the workers. The workers have not yet been dispossessed of them. They are still the legal owners via the Congress of Peoples Deputies.

In its current ideological and political expression, the Congress speaks the language of the bourgeoisie and not the language of the proletarian class struggle, with the exception of some deputies who are not heard very much. Yet the Congress opposes the outright counterrevolution and its robbery of the workers' and collectivized property.

The Congress has made numerous concessions in the course of its dealings with the Yeltsin cabal. It deals with them as one branch of government to another branch, instead of acting as the political expression of the workers' state, the legal descendant of the Congress of Soviets of Workers and Peasants. Moreover, it appears that the Congress at this time does not seek to rally the masses, to confer with them. It is not a revolutionary tribune.

The Congress has all the inconsistencies of a timid, bourgeois parliament in fear of the repressive action of the military and bureaucratic apparatus of an old nobility. Yet it has revolutionary potential if it rallies, if it seeks to address the masses, to urge them on, instead of secretly caucusing with the workers' class enemy.

Now that it has rebuffed a Yeltsin-Gaidar assault, it cannot rest on its laurels. It has many ready-made initiatives at hand that do not go beyond the framework of its legal authority, which is the authority of a workers' state.

It can deprive the Yeltsin counterrevolution of any and all expenditures and stop all further appropriations. It must openly declare that all the economic, financial and banking authority, including all monies and gold, are under the jurisdiction of the Congress.

To take such a decisive step would also clear up the Congress's relationship to the military, the police, and internal security forces. It would say that the Congress alone holds the power of the purse, even as a bourgeois parliament does. And it will not cravenly surrender this power to the so-called executive branch of unelected bourgeois officials.

This is a transitional period. The class character of the transition is from the proletarian state to the bourgeoisie. But the bourgeoisie finds itself incapable, as the last six years has made it abundantly clear, of making the transition to a bourgeois state, to bourgeois ownership. The stumbling block is the collective ownership of the means of production, which the individual industrialists cannot disgorge.

Counting on the bankers

To understand Gorbachev, and even more so Yeltsin, it must be remembered that their plans have always counted on one indispensable element: the support of the imperialists for the capitalist transformation of the USSR. Not just support and sympathy in the abstract, but massive loans and credits from the bankers in particular. The bankers would open up their purses rather generously, in the view of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, since it is so much in the interests of the bankers to do so.

What they apparently did not take into their calculations is that this is precisely the hope of neo-colonialist elements throughout the world. They think banks just lavishly lend, without calculating the net return. However, the process of borrowing and lending is part of the circulation of world finance capital and is intimately tied to the capitalist mode of production for profit.

There is not an iota of sympathy or antipathy in their calculation. Profit is the motive force.

Members of the Congress of Peoples Deputies have given hundreds of speeches protesting that the process of reaching out to the banks will ultimately mean that the territory of the former USSR will become a raw materials base for the imperialist monopolies.

But as rich as the USSR is in natural materials, it is not the only place on the planet where they can be obtained. They have been obtained elsewhere for decades. And the cost of labor in the less-developed countries is much lower than in the USSR, which, in the opinion of the bankers, is still encumbered with socialist restrictions.

The principal selling point used by both Yeltsin and Gorbachev to the imperialist governments, especially the United States, is the peaceful, cooperative policy of their administrations. But this has been oversold, not only by them but even by the previous administrations. The imperialists are only interested in the destruction of the socialist economy and not in its rehabilitation as a capitalist rival.

Dusko Doder, in his book "Gorbachev" (Penguin, 1990), said the capitalists are afraid that a developed capitalist economy in the USSR could also become a challenger, although on different terms than the Soviet government was. They fear the USSR could reconstitute itself and present the same formidable challenge, but change the nature of the competition with the imperialist West from socialism to capitalism.

Whatever the bourgeois politicians disseminate in the way of propaganda for consumption of the broad masses and of unwary political leaders who represent them, the one undeviating objective and motivation of capitalist imperialism is superprofit. And this will not change unless the workers and oppressed peoples rid the planet of it.



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