After decades of war
Angolan troops push back UNITA mercenaries
By G.
Dunkel
After 40 years of war, the government of Angola, potentially
one of Africa's richest countries with oil, diamonds and
extensive agriculture, appears to have gained some decisive
victories over the mercenary army of UNITA.
Two strongholds of UNITA--Bailundo and Andulo--fell to the
Armed Forces of Angola on Oct. 20. In addition to recapturing
Andulo and Bailundo, the government also announced that it was
now in control of a number of strategic towns in the central
highlands, the north and the south--areas long dominated by
UNITA.
Andulo was a key UNITA airfield and operational
headquarters, while Bailundo has historical significance to the
group and is considered its symbolic capital.
Another major blow to UNITA occurred when the De Beers
company, under pressure from the South African government, now
led by the African National Congress, announced Oct. 5 that it
would no longer sell Angolan diamonds from UNITA's mines. The
$5 billion a year from diamond sales had assured UNITA of
abundant weapons and supplies.
Angola has been fighting for its independence from
imperialism since 1961, when the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) began the struggle against
Portuguese colonialism. When it became clear that the MPLA,
which had a good relationship with the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, could win the war, the U.S. began to spend
billions on building UNITA into a major adversary.
According to a United Nations estimate, two-thirds of the
economic infrastructure of the country was destroyed in the
ensuing war. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed
since 1975. Over 100,000 Angolans have lost limbs from mines,
most of which were laid by UNITA but made in the United
States.
The United States has provided more covert aid to UNITA than
to any other place in the world except Afghanistan, another
poor country where Washington stepped in against a progressive
revolution.
Background of UNITA and Savimbi
Jonas Savimbi formed UNITA in 1963. During the 1970s he had
a written agreement with the Portuguese colonialists to
cooperate militarily against the MPLA. William Minter's book
"Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier" documents
this in detail.
When the Portuguese were forced to leave in 1975, the year
Angola became independent, Savimbi turned to the apartheid
regime in South Africa for military muscle and to the U.S.
ruling class for funding, logistical and political support. It
was the U.S. government that helped UNITA develop essential
ties to the Mobutu regime in Zaire, which until then had backed
other pro-imperialist groups in Angola.
In 1975, apartheid South Africa invaded with the intention
of setting up a puppet government in Angola under UNITA. Angola
issued a call for help and Cuba responded. During the next 13
years, Angolan forces, with the help of Cuba and ANC
volunteers, fought South Africa and UNITA. The CIA stayed in
the background, supplying intelligence, advice and political
support to UNITA.
During the 1980s Savimbi began to be championed by Sen.
Jesse Helms, the right-wing extremist from North Carolina, and
by Col. Oliver North, more known for what he did to Nicaragua
and Central America. Savimbi was officially received by Reagan
in the White House, a high honor indeed for an African
"guerrilla" leader.
Since 1991, when the Cuban forces left, the United Nations
has worked for "peace" in Angola by forcing the MPLA government
to make literally thousands of concessions to UNITA. At the
same time, the UN ignored and condoned substantial UNITA
violations of a number of international agreements and UN
resolutions.
This campaign has been blessed by Washington, which has paid
half the costs of the UN operation in Angola. The U.S. owes the
UN over $1 billion in unpaid dues, but this was one UN
operation that the right wing here had no objection to paying
for.
The U.S. also holds out the prospect of "normal" relations,
investment and World Bank loans, and vows to pressure UNITA to
behave. But the only real penalty imposed on UNITA has been
preventing its leaders from traveling abroad.
A good example of how this policy concretely works is the
cease-fire and elections in 1991-1992. The U.S. managed to
persuade Angola to call a cease-fire in 1991 and to allow the
UN to supervise an election in 1992. The U.S. expected its main
tool, Jonas Savimbi, to win.
A UNITA victory would have been presented as a repudiation
of the Angolan government's Marxist past, a rejection of its
substantial help from Cuba, the ANC and the South African
Communist Party, and acceptance of unfettered U.S. access to
Angola's vast riches.
The UN overlooked substantial electoral violence and
outright fraud by UNITA. But still the MPLA won the election,
which the UN had to call "basically fair." After a failed coup
attempt, UNITA renewed the civil war, which it waged more
viciously than ever. Twice since then, the UN and the U.S. have
put tremendous pressure on the MPLA to agree to "peace"
settlements.
But UNITA did not want peace, it wanted power. And the MPLA
was not willing to surrender. Finally, the MPLA decided that
the only real solution was to stop making concessions. It told
the UN to leave in March 1999. After some reverses, it now has
gained momentum and is rapidly pushing UNITA back.
A victory for Angola and the MPLA would be a victory for the
worldwide struggle against imperialism.
This article is copyright under a Creative Commons License.
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